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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article examines in depth an important but underappreci-
ated development in international labor law:  How norms promul-
gated by the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) have affected 
the development and implementation of domestic labor laws and 
practices since the early 1990s.  The newly globalized focus of labor 
law—energized by substantial expansions in international trade and 
investment—has been recognized by scholars, practitioners, and 
governments, but it has not previously been explored and analyzed 
in this systematic way. 
The Article focuses on two central regulatory areas—child labor 
and freedom of association—and relies on doctrinal and policy de-
velopments in these areas, as evidenced by the actions of legisla-
tures, courts, and executive branches in more than twenty countries.  
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In doing so, the Article addresses how international labor standards 
have influenced national labor law and practice in the Americas (ex-
cluding the United States)—directly through the soft-law route of 
convention ratification and ILO supervisory monitoring, and indi-
rectly through trade agreement labor provisions that incorporate 
ILO norms.  The resultant changes in domestic laws and practices 
have been evolutionary rather than transformative, and develop-
ments in law outpace those in practice, but within these parameters 
the changes have been substantial.  The Article then places this in-
ternationalizing trend in the context of two recognized theories that 
seek to explain the socialization of human rights law. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early 1990s, the rights and protections accorded to 
workers in their own countries have been increasingly influenced by 
international labor norms.1  A major reason for labor law’s more 
globalized focus has been the substantial expansion in levels of in-
ternational trade and investment.2  The growing attention paid to 
the relationship between international and domestic labor law has 
consequences for tens of millions of workers and also for national 
governments, multinational corporations, and international public 
bodies.  This Article examines how international labor law norms—
specifically those promulgated by the International Labor Organiza-
tion (“ILO”)—have affected the development and implementation 
of national labor legislation in the past twenty-five years.  The Arti-
cle focuses on laws and practices in the Americas, although its de-
scriptive and normative observations have broader reach. 
A threshold question is how to characterize the impact of inter-
national labor norms in the domestic labor law arena.  The title given 
to me for an earlier presentation on this topic referred to The Evolu-
tion and Transformation of Sources of Labor Law.  This suggests a view 
that there has been both evolution and transformation in labor law 
sources.  Yet, these two concepts—evolution and transformation—
are often viewed as divergent, if not contrasting.  One tends to think 
of a body of law as evolving or, in the alternative, that same body of 
law being transformed. 
In the United States setting, for example, labor law has evolved 
over seventy years since the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(“NLRA”) and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
                                                      
 1 See HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (2015); 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES (James A. Gross & Lance Compa eds., 2009); LABOUR RIGHTS 
AS HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
2 See, e.g., Annual Session of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, Back 
to Basics: Connecting Politics and Trade, at 23 (Nov. 15–16, 2012) (reporting global 
merchandise trade in 2011 was more than five times its value in 1990); IMF, Foreign 
Direct Investment Trends and Statistics (Oct. 2003), https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/sta/fdi/eng/2003/102803.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FFG-9F8K] (reporting 
foreign direct investment increased by an average of 13% a year from 1990–97, and 
nearly 50% a year from 1998–2000).  
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(“LMRA”).3  It has done so essentially without legislative participa-
tion—based on a series of incremental decisions from courts and 
agencies, engaged in a continuing dialogue during decades of legis-
lative gridlock.4  Indeed, the relative absence of legislative or consti-
tutional change in U.S. labor law over many decades is one of its 
most distinctive features.  If evolution in the law is considered a 
more gradual and incremental process, and transformation a more 
sudden and radical shift, the question is more aptly framed as 
whether there has been an evolution or a transformation of sources 
of labor law. 
The time-frame explored in this Article begins more recently 
than enactment of the NLRA and LMRA.  The Article examines 
changes in labor law sources over the past twenty-five to thirty 
years, dating from about 1990.  In this shorter time period, it may be 
easier to characterize rapid evolution in sources of law as function-
ally equivalent to transformation.  Nonetheless, the Article contends 
that sources of labor law in the Americas have not been transformed 
or altered in radically transformative ways.  But, sources have been 
imported from outside of national contexts, and these sources have 
influenced and altered traditional domestic structures, in ways and 
at speeds I would consider quite significant—at times even rapidly 
incremental although not cathartically transformative. 
The Article focuses on two areas of labor law:  Child Labor, which 
implicates certain minimum substantive protections, and Freedom of 
                                                      
3 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74–198 (codified principally at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935)); Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80–101 
(codified principally at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (1947)).  
4 See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 
26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 221 (2004–2005); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group 
Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996).  Judicial and agency 
decisions “make law” in common law countries in ways they do not in civil law 
settings, but the United States pattern is unique even when compared to other com-
mon law countries.  In Canada, Britain, and Australia, the norm is for legislatures 
to play the lead role in modifying and updating statutes.  Legislative activity may 
be part of an ongoing dialogue involving responsive court and agency decisions, or 
it may reflect an initiation of change for extrinsic policy reasons.  Such legislative 
activity has been an integral part of labor law development in all major common 
law countries since 1950, except the United States.  One might consider the seventy-
year evolutionary pattern of the NLRA and LMRA to be transformative, in the 
sense that this essentially unmodified statute is now understood to provide dra-
matically less protection for workers and unions than it was thought to offer when 
enacted.  That change, however, is due largely to external factors, notably a trans-
formed set of economic and social conditions (e.g., automation and other techno-
logical developments, immigration, public and political hostility to unions, and 
globalization) rather than a transformative change in law itself. 
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Association, which involves basic participatory voice.  Within this 
dual focus, it addresses the impact of four fundamental ILO Con-
ventions,5 examining how ILO norms have had a pronounced evo-
lutionary effect on domestic labor law instruments, and to a lesser 
extent on domestic labor law practices.  This evolutionary impact 
has developed through two distinct institutional channels.6  The 
ILO’s established mechanisms, by which member states ratify labor 
conventions and are then monitored for compliance in law and prac-
tice, have created soft law pressures contributing to domestic 
change.  In addition, the proliferation of labor provisions incorpo-
rating ILO norms into bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
has promoted legislative adjustments as part of more traditional 
pressures between countries for reciprocal compliance. 
This pronounced evolutionary effect is not seamlessly coherent 
as applied to an entire hemisphere of thirty-five countries, mainly 
because it encompasses two distinct fault-lines.  One is the im-
portant division between changes in law and changes in practice.  
When labor statutes or decrees, labor provisions in constitutions, or 
labor decisions by domestic courts are substantially modified to take 
account of international norms, there remains the question of effects 
on the ground:  How are the changes being implemented, moni-
tored, enforced, and sanctioned?  Often, the reality of changes in 
practice lags behind the claims or aspirations associated with 
changes in law.  The second fault line is the existence of substantial 
                                                      
5 For treatment of Child Labor issues, see ILO Convention (No. 138) Concern-
ing Minimum Age for Administration of Employment, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 
297 [hereinafter ILO Convention 138]; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter ILO Convention 182].  For 
treatment of Freedom of Association issues, see ILO Convention (No. 87) Concern-
ing Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 
U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ILO Convention 87]; ILO Convention (No. 98) Concerning 
the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collec-
tively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter ILO Convention 98].  
6 The Article does not address the role of ILO norms in other prominent inter-
national human rights covenants.  The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights 
are multilateral treaties adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in De-
cember 1966 and in force by January 1976.  See International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant 
on Political and Civil Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  The covenants are 
monitored by separate U.N. committees, each of which references and often defers 
to ILO reports and observations when reviewing how workplace-related human 
rights are being implemented by signatory states. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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country-specific variations in legal culture and history, such that la-
bor law sources have shifted or evolved at different paces and with 
differing impacts over the past quarter-century.  Variations in expe-
rience among countries in the Americas are admittedly quite im-
portant.  At the same time, I cannot do justice to the specific narra-
tives for twelve countries in South America, seven countries in 
Central America, thirteen countries in the Caribbean region, and 
three countries in North America.  Accordingly, my examples focus 
on a smaller number of countries across the region.7 
The Article omits considering any changes in sources of law 
within the United States, due to the United States’ self-proclaimed 
exceptionalism stance regarding the impact of international human 
rights law and norms.  This exceptionalism, asserted regularly in 
Congress and the Supreme Court, has precluded any serious impact 
from transnational sources on U.S. domestic labor law.8  On the 
other hand, the United States has been a major player in leveraging 
                                                      
7 Specifically, the Article focuses on the following regions and countries: (1) in 
South America, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Peru; (2) in Central America, Guate-
mala, El Salvador, and Panama; and (3) in North America, Canada and Mexico. 
8 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia stated: “We emphasize that it is American conceptions of de-
cency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners . . . that the sen-
tencing practices of other countries are relevant”); AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).   
 Although U.S. workplace law largely comports with ILO conventions on cer-
tain subjects (e.g., nondiscrimination under ILO Convention 111), there are notable 
gaps between U.S. labor relations law and freedom of association and collective 
bargaining norms under ILO Conventions 87 and 98.  For example:  
(1) U.S. employers have the right to hinder employee free choice (e.g., 
through captive audience speeches); 
(2) U.S. employers may exclude union organizers from employer prop-
erty, Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992);  
(3)  entire categories of U.S. workers are excluded from statutory coverage 
(e.g., agricultural workers, domestic workers, and public employees);  
(4)  employers may hire permanent replacements during strikes, NLRB v. 
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938);  
(5)  minority unions lack the right to bargain when no majority exists; and  
(6) public employees do not have collective bargaining rights in many 
states.   
See generally Lance Compa, National and International Labor Rights, in VOICES AT 
WORK: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 364, 367–68 (Alan 
Bogg & Tonia Novitz eds., 2014); Cesar Rosado Marzan, Labor’s Soft Means and Hard 
Challenges: Fundamental Discrepancies and the Promise of Non-Binding Arbitration for 
International Framework Agreements, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1749, 1793–98 (2014). 
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the impact of free trade agreements as sources of change for the la-
bor laws of other countries, as discussed below. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides background 
on the overall direction of labor regulation in Latin America since 
1980, and on the ILO’s mission and basic structure.  Section 3 exam-
ines the influence of ILO norms on domestic labor legislation in the 
Americas since 1990.  It describes considerable changes in domestic 
law addressed to child labor and freedom of association.  These 
changes reflect the influence of both soft law pressure flowing from 
the ILO supervisory mechanisms and incentives emanating from 
trade agreement labor provisions.  Section 4 considers the lesser im-
pact of these ILO norms on domestic practice.  One factor that argu-
ably creates headwinds for the practical application of labor laws in 
Latin American countries is the presence of a more conciliatory, less 
sanctions-oriented approach to enforcement than exists in the 
United States.  In addition, presumptively related to competition be-
tween countries for export share, governments may dilute their in-
tensity of commitment to international labor norms by lowering en-
forcement efforts rather than “walking back” changes in law itself.  
Section 5 situates the evolution of labor law sources in a larger inter-
national human rights law context. 
 
2.  LABOR REGULATION IN LATIN AMERICA   
AND BASIC ILO STRUCTURE 
 
2.1.  Background Pattern of Ideological Change 
 
From 1980 onward, the overall path in the politics of labor regu-
lation in Latin America has been toward restored or newly created 
labor protections.9  Labor relations scholars have attributed this 
                                                      
9 See Mark Anner, Labor Law Reform and Union Decline in Latin America, 2008 
LABOR AND EMP’T RELATIONS ASS’N 149 (discussing protective labor reforms in Latin 
America and their limitations); Andrew Schrank & Michael Piore, Norms, Regula-
tions, and Labour Standards in Central America, in ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS (2007), 
http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/5002/S0700170_en.pdf?se-
quence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/MET7-48EJ] (evaluating the organiza-
tion, nature, and prospects for labor law enforcement in Central America and the 
Dominican Republic); M. Victoria Murillo & Andrew Schrank, With a Little Help 
from My Friends: Partisan Politics, Transnational Alliances, and Labor Rights in Latin 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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trend to a confluence of several factors:  the demilitarization of gov-
ernment structures; the democratization of political participation 
and power-sharing; and the emergence of more diversified econo-
mies.10  Over these decades, there has been some ebb and flow be-
tween reforms that coincide with wider democratic participation 
(enhancing rights and protections, both for individual workers and 
collectively for trade unions) and reforms that respond to free-mar-
ket policies and pressures (encouraging informal employment and 
increased flexibilization in labor relations).11 
From a big-picture perspective in Latin America, governments 
in the 1990s often supported pro-market weakening of worker 
standards—through “flexibilizing” changes in law and practice—
whereas, since 2000, governments have tended to be more protective 
of worker rights and interests.12  Again, speaking in general terms, 
the weakening of protections in the 1990s via pro-market reforms 
that encouraged flexible and informal employment arrangements 
often had an adverse effect on individual rights more than collective 
rights.  Where organized labor was sufficiently strong, the bargain-
ing coverage and political heft of unions minimized the prospects 
for such weakening.13 
                                                      
America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 971 (2005) (explaining why Latin American govern-
ments adopted union-friendly labor reforms in 1980s and 1990s). 
10 See MATTHEW E. CARNES, CONTINUITY DESPITE CHANGE: THE POLITICS OF 
LABOR REGULATION IN LATIN AMERICA 2–3 (2014); MARIA LORENA COOK, THE POLITICS 
OF LABOR REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: BETWEEN FLEXIBILITY AND RIGHTS 14 (2013); 
Schrank & Piore, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
11 See CARNES, supra note 10, at 5–8; COOK, supra note 10, at 13–14; Maria Victo-
ria Murillo et al., Latin American Labor Reforms: Evaluating Risk and Security, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMICS 790, 792–95, 801–02 (José Anto-
nio Ocampo & Jaime Ros eds., 2011).  Other factors have contributed to Latin Amer-
ican nations’ uneven receptivity to neoliberal economics, on the one hand, and in-
ternational human rights law, on the other.  See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT 
G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND 
THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002) (examining legal and 
economic developments since 1960s in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico).   
12 See, e.g., COOK, supra note 10, at 32–37; Salo V. Coslovsky, Flying Under the 
Radar?  The State and the Enforcement of Labour Laws in Brazil, 42 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 
169, 171 (2014).  See also Graciela Bensusan, Legislation and Labor Policy in Latin Amer-
ica: Crisis, Renovation, or Restoration?, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 655, 664–70 (2013) 
(concluding that since 2000, labor protections that eroded in the 1990s have been 
expanded and reaffirmed in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, although not in 
Mexico). 
13 See CARNES, supra note 10, at 2–3, 5, 14; COOK, supra note 10, at 7, 25.  See also 
Murillo & Schrank, supra note 9, at 972 (identifying growth of collective labor rights 
in 1990s and attributing this development in some countries to the influence of tra-
ditional labor-backed political parties, and in other countries to pressure from U.S. 
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Notwithstanding these general trends, the impact from the cy-
cles of development has differed, at times substantially, among 
countries.  Thus, for example, Argentina and Brazil tended to have 
strong organized labor and only moderate pro-market reforms dur-
ing these years.14  By contrast, organized labor was weaker in Chile 
and Peru, and more extensive pro-market reforms took hold during 
the period.15  Moreover, the larger difference between the 1990s pro-
flexibility direction and the post-2000 trend toward greater worker 
protections should not obscure the reality that cross-country varia-
tions in these labor market reforms have been more pronounced 
within each of the two periods than between them.16  One illustra-
tion of cross-country variations is in areas of non-standard employ-
ment:  There is a broad range of reliance on temporary employment 
contracts and notable differences persist in the proportion of invol-
untary part-time workers.17 
Still, over a period of several decades when a number of Euro-
pean countries, enamored of market reform, have been pursuing an 
agenda of softer individual employee protections and/or reduced 
collective labor rights,18 the Latin American picture is relatively sup-
                                                      
trade unions and human rights activists).  It seems relevant to recognize a missing 
counterfactual.  It is not known whether the pro-market neoliberal pressures dis-
cussed by Carnes and Cook would have resulted in greater adverse impact on in-
dividual or collective labor rights if not for the internationalizing influences de-
scribed in Sections 3 and 4 infra.  
14 COOK, supra note 10, at 20–24; see also CARNES, supra note 10, at 55 (discussing 
Mexico’s extensive and protective labor codes); Murillo & Schrank, supra note 9, at 
975 (listing countries with union-friendly and union-averse collective labor laws 
enacted in 1990s).  As discussed infra Section 4, gaps between enacted laws and 
actual practices are often substantial in this collective rights area. 
15 COOK, supra note 10, at 20–24. 
16 See generally Murillo et al., supra note 11, at 794–95 (listing legal reforms af-
fecting external flexibility enacted in thirteen countries from 1985–1999 and 2000–
2010).  
17 See ILO, Nonstandard Employment Around the World: Understanding Challenges, 
Shaping Prospects 60–62, (2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-
dgreports/—-dcomm/—-publ/documents/publication/ wcms_534326.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P92H-TN84] (describing divergent evolution of temporary em-
ployment in seven Latin American countries between 2003 and 2014); id. at 78–80 
(discussing trends in involuntary part-time work as a percentage of total part-time 
work in five Latin American countries from 2003 to 2013). 
18 See David Rueda, Social Democracy and Active Labour-Market Policies: Insiders, 
Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Promotion, 36 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 385, 392–93 
(2006) (describing labor policies under Thatcher government); Andrew Glyn & 
Stewart Wood, Economic Policy under New Labour: How Social Democratic is the Blair 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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portive of worker protections in general terms.  The question ad-
dressed in what follows is the extent to which sources of law outside 
of increasingly democratized and economically diversified national 
circumstances have contributed to or accounted for these develop-
ments in labor law and practice. 
 
2.2.  The ILO Structure and ‘Soft Law’ Pressures 
 
The ILO is a specialized agency within the U.N. system.  It was 
created in 1919 as an agency of the League of Nations, becoming part 
of the U.N. system in 1946.  Unlike other U.N. specialized agencies, 
the ILO has a tripartite governing structure.  Each of the 187 member 
states is represented not only by governments but also by national 
and international organizations of employers and of workers (i.e., 
social partners); their right of participation as representatives in-
cludes the right to vote.19  This tripartite structure encourages free 
and open exchanges among governments and social partners, which 
tends to result in a more pragmatic and persuasive standard-setting 
process than is possible for intergovernmental organizations. 
The ILO’s mission is to promote social justice through interna-
tionally recognized labor and human rights.  It has carried out that 
mission by promulgating labor standards in the form of Conven-
tions, monitoring implementation of these standards, and providing 
technical support and training to governments and social partners 
                                                      
Government?, 72 POL. Q. 50, 62–63 (2001) (describing labor policies under Blair gov-
ernment); Reimut Zohlnho ̈fer, Partisan Politics, Party Competition and Veto Players: 
German Economic Policy in the Kohl Era, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y 123, 145–46 (2003) (describing 
labor policies under Kohl government).  See generally Thorsten Schulten & Torsten 
Mu ̈ller, A New European Interventionism?  The Impact of the New European Economic 
Governance on Wages and Collective Bargaining, in SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 181 (David Natali & Bart Vanhercke eds., 2013).  
19 The standard ratio of representation is 2:1:1, or two government, one em-
ployer, and one worker.  See ILO Constitution art. 3, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:62:0::NO::P62_LIST_
ENTRIE_ID,P62_LANG_CODE:2453907,en [https://perma.cc/4VFL-8VRM].  
Each of the 187 member states at the International Labor Conference has four mem-
ber delegates.  The Conference, which is a parliamentary-type organization, meets 
at least once every year—typically in June—to develop and adopt labor standards 
and recommendations and to approve other policies involving ILO program and 
budget.  The ILO Governing Body meets more often during the year to set the 
agenda and draft a program and budget for submission to the Conference.  It is 
composed of twenty-eight government representatives, fourteen employer repre-
sentatives, and fourteen worker representatives.  See id. art. 7. 
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seeking to conform their own laws and practices with the stand-
ards.20  The ILO has promulgated 189 conventions through 2016.21  
These instruments are adopted by the International Labor Confer-
ence; conventions that are then ratified by member States—at their 
option—essentially function as treaties for purposes of implementa-
tion. 
Conventions promulgated by the ILO aim to identify certain 
rights and protections for individuals and to protect those individ-
uals from transgression by their own governments.22  As such, they 
lack the reciprocal compliance incentives that exist for international 
agreements between governments, such as trade agreements or 
arms agreements where a violation by State A may be met with a 
reciprocal violation by State B.  If, for example, Guatemala permits 
or participates in the imprisonment or murder of trade union lead-
ers, the United States is not going to respond or retaliate by impris-
oning or murdering its own labor leaders.  Thus, while ILO conven-
tions create hard-law commitments in that they are legally binding 
when ratified, these conventions have underlying soft-law charac-
teristics inasmuch as they are largely unenforceable through recip-
rocal or other transnational means.23  Instead, they depend on do-
mestic law enforcement for effective implementation. 
How does this domestic enforcement occur?  Once a member 
State has ratified an ILO convention, it is required to report regularly 
on measures taken to implement the convention in law and practice, 
and to submit copies of this report to representative employer and 
worker organizations within the country.  The ILO has developed 
                                                      
20 ILO, Mission and Impact of the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/B2P9-N43R] 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
21 Convention 189, the Domestic Workers Convention, was adopted by the In-
ternational Labor Conference in 2011.  A complete list and description of the Con-
ventions is available on the ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/lang—en/in-
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/7SRF-EF82].  In addition, the ILO has promulgated 204 
Recommendations—also listed on its website—that do not have the binding force 
of conventions and are not subject to ratification.  Recommendations may supple-
ment conventions with additional or more detailed provisions, or they may address 
issues separate from particular conventions. 
22 See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 
51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 592 (2007) (showing common goal of international trea-
ties is to protect rights of individuals against violations by their own governments).   
23 See id. at 592–93 (arguing enforcement of these treaties does not depend on 
other states but on actors within the state itself). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
  
2017] Internationalization of Sources of Labor Law 13 
various means of supervising and monitoring convention imple-
mentation.  Of particular relevance here is the work of three super-
visory committees. 
The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (“CEACR”) examines the government re-
ports,24 along with responsive comments from employer and 
worker organizations.  As the only non-tripartite supervisory com-
mittee,25 the CEACR is charged with making impartial observations 
that address questions or concerns regarding a country’s progress 
toward compliance in law and practice.  Committee observations on 
the application of ratified conventions are published in an annual 
report, usually prepared in December.  These observations form the 
basis of an ongoing dialogue with member States, as governments—
with continuing input from employers’ and workers’ organiza-
tions—seek to apply the conventions they have ratified. 
The annual CEACR report also is examined by the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Standards (“CAS”) at the Interna-
tional Labor Conference the following June.  The CAS, which is tri-
partite in membership, selects approximately twenty-five CEACR 
observations reflecting especially serious instances of noncompli-
ance for full discussion.26  The identified governments are “invited” 
                                                      
24 See Int’l Labour Conference [ILC], Rep. of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations [CEACR], Application of Inter-
national Labour Standards 2017 (I), at 7, Report III (Part 1A) (2017), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_543646.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BJG-RUKR].  
Reporting cycles vary for different types of conventions.  The current cycle is three 
years for fundamental conventions, such as the child labor and freedom of associa-
tion conventions examined in this Article, and five years for technical conventions, 
such as those involving safety and health or social security.  In cases where serious 
compliance issues have arisen, the CEACR often requests interim reports in a 
shorter time frame.  
25 The CEACR, established in 1926, is composed of twenty eminent jurists ap-
pointed by the Governing Body for up to five three-year terms.  The Experts, who 
are judges, practitioners, legal academics, and human rights specialists, come from 
different geographic regions, legal systems, and cultures.  Their role is to provide 
an impartial and technical evaluation of the state of application of international la-
bor standards.  See id. at 10 (presenting Mandate of the Committee); id. at 31–34 
(presenting brief biographies of current Committee members) 
26 The CAS also was established in 1926.  See id. at 7.  The number of serious 
instances of noncompliance to be selected for full discussion is agreed upon be-
tween the vice chairs for the international employers’ and international workers’ 
organizations.  It has varied slightly in recent years, but is now set at twenty-four 
CEACR observations. For examples of full discussion, see ILC, Conference 
Committee on the Application of Standards [CAS], Extracts from the Record of 
Proceedings, Part II/5 (2017), http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
14 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:1 
to appear before the International Labor Conference and explain or 
defend their implementation efforts.  Based on the information these 
governments provide, the CAS issues conclusions recommending 
that governments take specific steps to remedy a problem, or that 
they request ILO missions or technical assistance.  The exchanges 
and CAS conclusions are published in the CAS annual report. 
A third plank of the supervisory mechanism, the tripartite Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association (“CFA”), was established in 1951 
based on recognition that the principle of freedom of association 
needed a further supervisory procedure to ensure compliance even 
in countries that had not ratified the recently promulgated Conven-
tions 87 and 98.  Unlike the CEACR and CAS, the CFA responds to 
outside complaints, brought against a member state by employers’ 
or workers’ organizations.  If the CFA finds there has been a viola-
tion of freedom of association standards or principles, it issues a re-
port through the Governing Body, makes recommendations on how 
the situation could be remedied, and requests a report from the gov-
ernment on implementation of its recommendations.27 
There are important additional elements of the ILO supervisory 
system,28 but in essence, the soft law pressure comes from ongoing, 
                                                      
and-promoting-international-labour-standards/conference-committee-on-the-ap-
plication-of-standards/WCMS_576287/lang—en/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9M8V-CYFV].  
27 For an overview of the CFA, see Applying and Promoting International Labour 
Standards: The Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-la-
bour-standards/committee-on-freedom-of-association/lang—en/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L4GL-G6JV] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).  In cases where the 
country has ratified the relevant conventions, the CFA may refer legislative aspects 
of the case to the CEACR.  The CFA also may propose a “direct contacts” mission 
to address the problem through a process of dialogue with government officials 
and social partners.  
28 Pursuant to Article 19 of the ILO Constitution—requiring Member States to 
report at the Governing Body’s request on their law and practice with respect to 
unratified as well as ratified Conventions—the CEACR publishes an in-depth an-
nual General Survey on Member States’ national law and practice, regarding a sub-
ject chosen by the Governing Body.  ILO Constitution, supra note 19, art. 19.  These 
General Surveys, based on information requested from all Member States, allow the 
CEACR to examine the impact of conventions, to analyze the challenges identified 
by governments as impeding their application or ratification, and to identify possi-
ble means for overcoming the challenges.  Under Article 24 of the Constitution, an 
employers’ organization or workers’ organization may present to the Governing 
Body a Representation that a Member State has failed to comply with a ratified 
convention.  Id. art. 24.  Under Article 26, a Member State that has ratified a conven-
tion may present to the Governing Body a Complaint against another Member State 
for noncompliance with the same ratified convention.  Id. art. 26.  Supervision under 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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participatory, and transparent review of government reports ad-
dressed to compliance efforts.  With worker representatives, em-
ployer representatives, and several supervisory committees provid-
ing input, governments are strongly encouraged to be accurate 
about the extent to which their laws and practices conform to rati-
fied conventions, and responsive to suggestions or urgings about 
how to improve those laws and practices.  Since roughly 1990, ILO 
activities through convention ratifications, supervisory monitoring, 
and provision of technical support to governments have had a direct 
and substantial influence on the development of domestic labor 
laws in the Americas. 
 
 3.  ILO NORMS AND DOMESTIC LABOR LAW 
 
3.1.  ILO Direct Influence on Domestic Labor Laws 
 
3.1.1.  Convention Ratification.   
 
The first and most powerful area of influence in the post-1990 
period stems from the ratification of conventions, especially alt-
hough not exclusively fundamental conventions.  Twenty-two 
countries in the Americas ratified both fundamental child labor con-
ventions in the period since 1990, with the heaviest activity between 
1990 and 2005.29 
 
                                                      
the Representation and Complaint procedures occurs on more than an occasional 
basis, but not nearly with the breadth and regularity of General Surveys, or of the 
supervisory observations, conclusions, and decisions produced by the CEACR, 
CAS, and CFA. 
29 The twenty-two countries in the Americas that ratified both Convention 138 
and Convention 182 are the following: Argentina, Barbados, Bahamas, Belize, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts 
& Nevis, and Trinidad & Tobago.  See ILO Convention 138, supra note 5; ILO Con-
vention 182, supra note 5.  Convention 182, addressed to the worst forms of child 
labor, was not adopted by the ILO until 1999.  Accordingly, Chart 1 focuses on 
countries that ratified this convention rapidly and that also approved Convention 
138—adopted in 1973 and addressing the minimum age for admission to employ-
ment—during the 1990s and early 2000s.  Id. 
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Chart 1 
 
This is a period in which the ILO notably intensified its commit-
ments to child labor as an issue, buttressed by the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which came into force in 1990 and has 
since been ratified by every member of the U.N. except the United 
States.30 
 Overall, the child labor ratification record of countries in the 
Americas is impressive over the past twenty-five years.  The record 
may reflect something of a ripple effect among Latin American gov-
ernments relating to child labor protections, in that widespread rat-
ifications may reassure peer countries in the region that regulating 
child labor will not put them in an inferior competitive position.31 
 A number of these countries also ratified one or both fundamen-
tal freedom of association and collective bargaining conventions in 
                                                      
30 The United States did ratify Convention 182 in 1999, ILO Convention 182, 
supra note 5; however, the United States has yet to ratify Convention 138.  ILO Con-
vention 138, supra note 5.  
31 See discussion at text accompanying notes infra 212–15.  See also Sara Kahn-
Nisser, The Ripple Effect: Peer ILO Treaty Ratification, Regional Socialization, and Col-
lective Labor Standards, 22 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 513, 525 (2016) (finding a ripple ef-
fect in EU countries since the late 1990s with respect to ratification of collective labor 
rights conventions, notably Conventions 87 and 98). 
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the same recent time frame.32  Convention 87 on Freedom of Associ-
ation was adopted in 1948, and Convention 98 on the Right to Or-
ganize and Collective Bargaining in 1949, and the vast majority of 
countries in the Americas had ratified both conventions decades 
prior to 1990. 
 
 
 
Chart 2 (Canada very recently ratified Convention 98, but the Con-
vention will not enter into force until June 2018.) 
                                                      
32 Chile, El Salvador, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines have 
all ratified ILO Convention 87 and ILO Convention 98 in the years since 1990.  Ad-
ditionally, Uruguay ratified four of the eight fundamental conventions between 
1989 and 2001—ILO Conventions 29, 100, 111, and 182—having ratified the four 
others several decades earlier.  ILO Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter ILO Convention 29]; 
ILO Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter ILO 
Convention 100]; ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect 
of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 384 U.N.T.S 385 [hereinafter ILO 
Convention 111]; ILO Convention 182, supra note 5. 
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There have been many other ratifications of ILO conventions 
from countries in the Americas since the early 1990s, including tech-
nical conventions related to occupational safety and health and so-
cial security protections, as well as the governance conventions in-
volving labor inspection and tripartite consultation.  A substantial 
number of safety and health ratifications have occurred within the 
past ten years, and almost all have been since 1990.33 
                                                      
33 For example, Argentina ratified ILO Convention 184 in 2006 and Conven-
tions 155 and 187 in 2014. 
(1) ILO Convention (No. 184) Concerning Safety and Health in Agricul-
ture, June 21, 2001, 2227 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter Safety and Health in Ag-
riculture Convention]; 
(2) ILO Convention (No. 155) Concerning Occupational Safety and Health 
and the Working Environment, June 21, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinaf-
ter Occupational Health and Safety Convention]; 
(3) ILO Convention (No. 187) Concerning the Promotional Framework for 
Occupational Safety and Health, June 15, 2006, 2564 U.N.T.S. 291 [herein-
after Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Con-
vention].   
 Brazil ratified ILO Conventions 167 and 176 in 2006.   
(1) ILO Convention (No. 167) Concerning Safety and Health in Construc-
tion, June 20, 1988, 1592 U.N.T.S 33 [hereinafter Safety and Health in Con-
struction Convention];  
(2) ILO Convention (No. 176) Concerning Safety and Health in Mines, June 
22, 1995, 2029 U.N.T.S. 207 [hereinafter Safety and Health in Mines Con-
vention].   
 Panama ratified ILO Convention 167 in 2008.  Safety and Health in Construc-
tion Convention, supra.   
 Peru ratified ILO Convention 176 in 2008.  Safety and Health in Mines Conven-
tion, supra.   
 Uruguay ratified ILO Conventions 167 and 184 in 2005 and ILO Convention 176 
in 2014.  Safety and Health in Construction Convention, supra; Safety and Health in 
Agriculture Convention, supra; see also Safety and Health in Mines Convention, su-
pra.   
 With respect to governance conventions, four countries have ratified ILO Con-
vention 81 since 1989: Brazil in 1989; El Salvador in 1995; St. Vincent & the Grena-
dines in 1998; and Trinidad & Tobago in 2001.  ILO Convention (No. 81) Concerning 
Labour Inspection in Industry and Commerce, July 11, 1947, 54 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after Labour Inspection Convention].  While a dozen or more countries had ratified 
this convention in prior decades, a number of major countries in the region have 
yet to ratify—including Canada, the United States, Mexico, and Chile.  The im-
portance of labor inspection for achieving compliance with ratified conventions in 
practice is addressed infra Section 4.  
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Chart 3 
 
Convention ratifications have frequently been accompanied by 
changes in domestic laws, reflecting a commitment to conform na-
tional constitutional or statutory standards to the international 
norms approved by governments.  To cite a prominent example in 
child labor, Brazil brought its Constitution into alignment with Con-
ventions 138 and 182, which it had ratified in 2000 and 2001.34  Bra-
zil’s changes in domestic law include an innovative Child and Ado-
lescent Statute to protect the rights of children in the workplace,35 a 
                                                      
34 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], art.7.XXXIII n.33 (Braz.) 
(stating the working age was raised from fourteen to sixteen with Amendment No. 
20 on Dec. 16, 1998); see also CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T] art. 403 
(setting the minimum working age at sixteen); Decreto No. 6.481 de 12 de Junho de 
2008 (Braz.) (revising the minimum working age to eighteen); Jerome September, 
Children’s Rights and Child Labour: A Comparative Study of Children’s Rights and 
Child Labour Legislation in South Africa, Brazil and India, (Feb. 2014) (M.A. dis-
sertation, Univ. of Cape Town) at 68, https://open.uct.ac.za/bit-
stream/item/9357/thesis_law_2014_september_j.pdf?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/TF3L-FT4D] (outlining the progress made to reduce and eradi-
cate the exploitation of children through the elimination of child labor). 
35 See Daniel Hoffman, The Struggle for Citizenship and Human Rights, North 
American Congress on Latin America, N. AM. CONG. ON LATIN AM. (1994), http://pan-
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constitutional amendment committing to a minimum age of sixteen 
for employment and eighteen for hazardous work,36 and presiden-
tial decrees in 2000 and 2002 mandating the implementation and en-
forcement of both conventions.37  As discussed in Section 4 below, 
Brazil’s practices have for the most part successfully implemented 
these new legal standards, and there has been a remarkable reduc-
tion in child labor from ages five to seventeen between 1992 and 
2012.38 
 Other countries also have adopted domestic child labor laws 
pursuant to their recent ratification of Conventions 138 and 182.  In 
Peru, the ratification of Convention 138 led to the increase of the 
minimum working age from twelve to fourteen, and to eighteen for 
hazardous work.39  Following ratification of Convention 138, Mexico 
in 2012 adopted for the first time a list of dangerous jobs with re-
strictions for youth between ages fourteen and seventeen; in 2015, it 
                                                      
gaea.org/street_children/latin/statute.htm [https://perma.cc/9A4N-Y5L4] (de-
scribing Child and Adolescent Statute of 1990 and its role in helping Brazil advance 
children’s human rights).  
36 See ILO, Int’l Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Business and 
the Fight Against Child Labour: Experience from India, Brazil and South Africa, at 34 
(2013) [hereinafter ILO, Business and Child Labour], http://www.ilo.org/ipec/Infor-
mationresources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_23484/lang—en/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SJH2-8NJY] (reporting on the efforts of the Brazilian govern-
ment to protect children from labor exploitation).  
37 See Decreto No. 3.597, de 12 de Septembro de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 13.09.2000 (Braz.) (mandating the implementation of ILO Convention 
138); Decreto No. 4.134, de 15 de Fevereiro de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 18.02.2002 (Braz.) (mandating the implementation of ILO Convention 
182).  
38 See Observation (CEACR) – Adopted (2015), Published 105th ILC Session (2016): 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), ILO 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3250782:NO [https://perma.cc/9CZA-L7FJ] (last visited Oct. 26, 
2017) (commenting on Brazil’s progress towards eliminating child labor); see also 
Patrick del Vecchio, Child Labor in Brazil: The Government Commitment, 10 EJOURNAL 
USA 4, 27 (2005), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-
english/EJ-child-labor-0505.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DYY-7YQW] (discussing Bra-
zil’s efforts in combating exploitative child labor practices since the 1990s); infra 
notes 96–98 and 193–95 and accompanying text.  
39 See CO ́DIGO DE LOS NIN ̃OS Y ADOLESCENTES [CHILD AND ADOLESCENT CODE] 
art. 51, 58 (Peru) (showing increases in minimum working age from twelve to four-
teen and to eighteen for hazardous work); see also BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS 
[ILAB], U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: 
PERU 3, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/re-
ports/child-labor/findings/2014TDA/peru.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUN5-HH62] 
(discussing measures taken by the Peruvian government to eliminate child labor 
exploitation and evaluating their effectiveness).  
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amended its constitution raising the minimum age for employment 
from fourteen to fifteen.40  Further examples include new legal re-
quirements in Chile41 and El Salvador.42 
With respect to freedom of association, most western hemi-
sphere governments have ratified both Convention 87 and Conven-
tion 98.43  These ratifications have served as an impetus for improve-
ments in collective rights laws following the demise of authoritarian 
rule and transitions towards a more democratic polity.  Thus, for 
instance, Brazil and Paraguay legalized unionization in the public 
sector.44  In four countries—Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Pan-
ama—legislation reduced the number of workers required to form a 
union.45  In three countries—Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and 
                                                      
40 See Ley Federal del Trabajo [LFT], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 30-
11-2012, reformado DOF 12-06-2015 (Mex.) (showing amended minimum age of 
employment as fifteen); INT’L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR 
[IPEC] EVALUATION, STOP CHILD LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE 4 (2014), 
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/projects/summaries/Mexico_Agriculture_feval.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/26FL-4AR4] (showing Mexico’s progress in eliminating child la-
bor).  
41 See Law No. 29539 art. 13–14, 18, Julio 31, 2002, CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO [CÓD. 
TRAB.] (Chile) (raising minimum working age to fifteen and for hazardous work to 
eighteen); see also ILAB, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF 
CHILD LABOR: CHILE 3, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/2014TDA/chile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K5JM-VX8R] (showing that the government of Chile has en-
acted laws prohibiting child trafficking and the commercial sexual exploitation of 
children).  Other Latin American countries also have laws or constitutional provi-
sions outlawing these worst forms of child labor. 
42 See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR Dec. 16, 1983, art. 38 
(raising the minimum age for work to fourteen); CÓDIGO DE TRABAJO, art. 105 (El 
Sal.). (setting the minimum age for hazardous work to eighteen); see also ILAB, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: EL SALVADOR 
3, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/reports/child-la-
bor/findings/2014TDA/elsalvador.pdf [https://perma.cc/37LF-8KFJ] (delineat-
ing measures taken by El Salvador to reduce child labor).   
43 Brazil has not ratified ILO Convention 87, Canada and Mexico have not rat-
ified ILO Convention 98, and the United States has not ratified either convention. 
44 See Anner, supra note 9, at 150 (discussing Brazil and Paraguay’s legalization 
of unionization in the public sector in the 1980s); MAURICIO RAND BARROS, LABOUR 
RELATIONS AND THE NEW UNIONISM IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL 69 (1999) (referring to 
Brazil’s recognition of the right of civil servants to unionize in the 1988 Constitu-
tion); see also THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN PARAGUAY 107–08 (Peter Lambert & 
Andrew Nickson eds., 1997) (referring to Paraguay’s recognition in 1992 Constitu-
tion).  
45 See Anner, supra note 9, at 150; see also CÓD. TRAB. arts. 227–28 (Chile); 
CÓDIGO DE TRABAJO arts. 211–12 (El Sal.); CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO (Nicar.) art. 206; 
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Peru—some strike regulations have been eased; for instance, a sim-
ple majority of workers can call a strike, not the prior 60% or 75%.46 
And Argentina and Peru gave unions a right of access to employer 
financial information in order to facilitate collective bargaining.47 
Importantly, domestic courts have invoked these Conventions 
and ILO norms to expand or clarify rights of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining under national law.  Perhaps the most dra-
matic recent illustration is the 2015 Canadian Supreme Court deci-
sion in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, which invalidated a provin-
cial law that severely limited the right to strike for public 
employees.48  In holding that freedom of association encompasses a 
right to strike under the Canadian Constitution, the court relied in 
part on Convention 87 as construed by both the CEACR and the 
CFA.49  In 2007, the Canadian Supreme Court had identified ILO 
norms to help justify a decision expanding collective bargaining 
protections for public sector workers.50 
In another very recent case, the Argentine Supreme Court in-
voked Convention 87 when affirming the appropriate scope of the 
                                                      
CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO (Pan.) art. 244 (discussing the reduction of the number of 
workers required to form a union in these four countries).  
46 See Mark Anner, Meeting the Challenges of Industrial Restructuring: Labor Re-
form and Enforcement in Latin America, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 33, 41 tbl.2 (2008) 
(listing the proportion of workers required to authorize a strike in Latin American 
countries before and after reforms).  In the Dominican Republic, the required per-
centage of workers voting for a strike decreased from greater than 60% to greater 
than 51%.  CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO art. 407.  In Nicaragua, the required percentage de-
creased from 60% to a simple majority.  CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO art. 244.  In Panama, 
the required percentage decreased from 75% to a simple majority.  LEY DE 
RELACIONES COLECTIVAS DE TRABAJO (Pan.) art. 73. 
47 See LEY DE RELACIONES COLECTIVAS DE TRABAJO (Peru) art. 41 (providing for 
access to wages, working conditions, productivity, and other issues); Law No. 
25013, Feb. 9, 1998, [CVI] B.O. (Arg.) (providing for exchange of information re-
garding profits, wages, and financial forecasts); see also VEGA RUIZ & MARIA LUZ, 
INT’L LAB. ORG., LA REFORMA LABORAL EN AMERICA LATINA: 15 AÑOS DESPUÉS (2005). 
48 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.R. 245 
(Can.).  
49 Id. at 285–87. 
50 See Health Services & Support v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.R. 391, 435–36 
(Can.) (invoking ILO Convention 87 and its interpretations by the CEACR and CFA 
to support conclusion that Canadian Charter of Rights encompasses right of union 
members to engage in collective bargaining); see also Brian Langille, Consistency, 
Consensus, or Coherence?  Legal Interpretation of Fundamental Rights, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 
EXPERTISE CENTER, ENSURING COHERENCE IN FUNDAMENTAL LABOR RIGHTS CASE LAW: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 60–61 (2016) (reporting Canadian Supreme Court 
relied extensively on ILO norms in 2007 and 2015 decisions). 
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right to strike under national law, relying in part on the ILO position 
that the internationally recognized right to strike may be reserved to 
authorized labor organizations rather than granted to individuals 
under national law.51  And the Colombian Constitutional Court in a 
1999 decision ordered reinstatement of workers who had been dis-
missed for taking part in a strike that had been declared illegal by 
the Ministry of Labor.52  The court invoked Conventions 87 and 98 
as construed by the CFA, concluding that because the strike had 
been declared unlawful by government administrative authority ra-
ther than by an independent body such as a court, the workers had 
been deprived of their right to an impartial determination.53 
The Colombian Constitutional Court has applied Convention 87 
doctrine directly in other cases,54 guided by the constitution’s incor-
poration of rights of association and right to strike, and its mecha-
nisms for their direct enforcement by the judiciary.55  Supreme 
                                                      
51 See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 7/6/2016, “Orellano, Francisco Daniel c. Correo Oficial de la  República 
Argentina S.A. / juicio sumarísimo,” http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-21852-La-Corte-
resolvi—que-solo-los-gremios-tienen-el-derecho-de-promover-huelgas-y-que-los-
grupos-informales-de-trabajadores-no-pueden-promover-medidas-de-fuerza.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZC-HLB8] (establishing that only unions, not individuals, 
are authorized to call industrial action); see also Supreme Court’s Ruling Limits Right 
of Workers to Strike, BUENOS AIRES HERALD (June 8, 2016), http://www.buenosai-
resherald.com/article/215769/supreme-court%E2%80%99s-ruling-limits-right-of-
workers-to-strike [https://perma.cc/G3UQ-3FU3] (reporting reactions from labor 
leaders, political parties, and human rights organizers to the aforementioned ruling 
and discussing its implications on workers’ right to strike).  
52 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 10, 1999, Senten-
cia T-568/99 (Colom.), Sindicato de las Empresas Varias de Medellín v. Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, 
http://compendium.itcilo.org/en/compendium-decisions/constitutional-court-
of-colombia-fourth-appellate-supervisory-chamber-sindicato-de-las-empresas-
varias-de-medellin-v.-ministry-of-labour-and-social-security-the-ministry-of-for-
eign-relations-the-municipio-of-medellin-and-empresas-varias-de-medellin-e 
[https://perma.cc/QBR9-E5DL]. 
53 Id.; see also ILO INTERNATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
LAW AND DOMESTIC LAW: A TRAINING MANUAL FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND LEGAL 
EDUCATORS 122 (Xavier Beaudonnet ed., 2010) [hereinafter Beaudonnet] (summa-
rizing decision).  
54 See, e.g., Beaudonnet, supra note 53, at 117 (summarizing 2008 decision by 
Colombian Constitutional Court that invoked ILO Convention 87 to help justify 
limiting the scope of labor code registration requirements for workers’ organiza-
tions so as to prohibit the government from exercising prior control over contents 
of trade union constitutions and rules).  
55 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 39 (right of association); 
C.P. art. 56 (right to strike); C.P. arts. 83–94 (protection and application of rights).  
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courts in Chile and Paraguay similarly have invoked Convention 87 
doctrine—to reinstate trade union representatives whose dismissal 
was deemed invalid, or to support a ruling that a presidential decree 
specifying rules for the election of trade union leaders was uncon-
stitutional.56 
There are also examples of courts applying ILO norms in other 
substantive areas. These include the Paraguayan Labour Court in 
2000, relying on Convention 111 (which prohibits inter alia sex dis-
crimination in employment) to interpret a national law as encom-
passing sexual harassment;57 and the Costa Rican Supreme Court in 
1999, citing ILO norms from Conventions 107 and 169—addressing 
protections for indigenous and tribal populations and peoples—to 
                                                      
See generally Maria Paula Saffron, Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Pow-
ers vis-à-vis Neoliberalism?  The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 5 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 533 (2007) (providing examples of the partial effectiveness of the judiciary 
in resisting neoliberal policies by vigorously protecting social rights, including 
workers’ rights). 
56 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 19 octubre 2000, 
“Stuardo, Víctor Améstida y otros c. Santa Isabel S.A.,” Rol de la causa: 10.695 
(Chile) (summarized in Beaudonnet, supra note 53, at 124); Corte Suprema de Justi-
cia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 23 septiembre 2000, “Acción de inconstitucionalidad 
planteada por la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) y la Central Nacional de 
Trabajadores (CNT) c. el Decreto núm. 16769 dictado por el Ejecutivo,” No. 35 
(Para.) (summarized in Beaudonnet, supra note 53, at 34). 
57 See “Carmen Sachelaridi Knutson c/ Cooperativa Santísimo Redentor Lim-
itada s/ cobro de guaraníes en div. conceptos,” May 26, 2000 (Para.) http://com-
pendium.itcilo.org/en/compendium-decisions/appellate-labour-court-second-
chamber-carmen-sachelaridi-knutson-v.-cooperativa-santisimo-redentor-ltda.-
concerning-payment-of-guaranis-for-several-items-26-may-2000-agreement-and-
decision-no.-40 [https://perma.cc/F3TN-FYQK] (referencing ILO Convention 111 
in order to stress that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination); Constance 
Thomas et al., The Use of International Labour Law in Domestic Courts: Theory, Recent 
Jurisprudence, and Practical Implications, in LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL: 
UN PATRIMOINE POUR L’AVENIR 249, 268–69 (Jean-Claude Javillier & Bernard Gerni-
gon eds., 2013).  
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overturn a national law restricting the rights of indigenous peo-
ples.58  Indeed, there are numerous instances of Latin American do-
mestic courts invoking Convention 169, especially concerning de-
velopment-related activities.59 
Stepping back, certain ILO Conventions have been effectively in-
corporated into the domestic legal order for some countries in Latin 
America without the need for a separate statute beyond the Act that 
authorized ratification of the treaty.60  Thus, for instance in Uruguay, 
where the constitution recognizes the right to unionize, ratification 
of Conventions 87 and 98 are the only legislative initiatives in the 
area:  broad union freedoms are protected under the Conventions 
without any other domestic laws.61  And in Colombia, the Constitu-
tion establishes that ILO Conventions ratified by the country are 
part of its internal rules of law.62  Additionally, the direct application 
                                                      
58 See Antonia Blanco Rodríguez y otros c/ el Presidente de la República, la 
Ministra de Gobernación y Policía, el Instituto de desarrollo Agrario y la Comisión 
Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, Supreme Court of Justice, Constitutional Chamber, 
11 de Agosto 1999 (Costa Rica), http://compendium.itcilo.org/es/compendium-
decisions/corte-suprema-de-justicia-sala-constitucional-antonio-blanco-rodri-
guez-y-otros-c-el-presidente-de-la-republica-la-ministra-de-gobernacion-y-policia-
el-instituto-de-desarrollo-agrario-y-la-comision-nacional-de-asuntos-indigenas-
11-de-agosto-de-1999 [https://perma.cc/38E5-S98G] (summarized in Thomas et al 
supra note 57, at 269-70; Beaudonnet, supra note 53, at 19).  
59 See Christian Courtis, Notes on the Implementation by Latin American Countries 
of the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous Peoples, in THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN THE 
RIGHT TO IDENTITY OF MINORITIES AND THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION 403, 
407–08 (Kristin Henard ed., 2013) (referring to judicial applications of ILO Conven-
tion 169 by courts in twelve Latin American countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela).  See generally S.J. Rombouts, The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consul-
tation Rights Under the ILO and U.N. Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169 (2017) (examin-
ing recent efforts in international law to give indigenous peoples rights to partici-
pate in decision-making processes affecting them); FERGUS MACKAY, A GUIDE TO 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 12 (2010) 
(describing how the ILO Governing Body handles cases concerning indigenous 
rights). 
60 See David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES 373–76 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2011) (detailing the role of domestic courts 
in treaty application). 
61 See Graciela Mazzuchi, Labour Relations in Uruguay, 2005–2008 10 (ILO, 
Working Paper No. 6, 2009), http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/inwork/cb-pol-
icy-guide/uruguaylabourrelations2005to2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/38KX-
D8QJ].  
62 See Francisco Rafael Ostau De Lafont de Leon & Ledy Angela Nino Cha-
varro, The Binding Nature of the Recommendations of the Committee of Freedom of Asso-
ciation in the Colombian Legal Framework, REVISTA REPUBLICANA, July-Dec. 2012, at 
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of ratified ILO Conventions as a primary source of law has been an 
increasingly potent arrow in the quiver of domestic courts—when 
there is no legislation addressing an issue covered by the Conven-
tion or when applicable domestic law is less detailed than the Con-
vention’s text or its application by ILO supervisory bodies.63 
Convention 169 is another useful illustration of the direct appli-
cation aspect.  The Convention has been ratified by fifteen countries 
in the Americas region—out of twenty-two ratifications globally.  
This ratification has led to enactment of implementing domestic stat-
utes but also to the Convention being applied through court actions 
brought by litigants on behalf of indigenous peoples.64 
These examples are not meant to suggest that ratification of con-
ventions is invariably followed by conforming changes in domestic 
labor laws.  Despite ratification, a country may retain labor laws that 
are incompatible with the norms set forth in the convention itself.65  
For instance, El Salvador ratified Convention 87 in 2006, but the Su-
preme Court of El Salvador held in 2007 that extending the right of 
freedom of association to employees in the public service was con-
trary to an article of the national Constitution.  While this article was 
amended in 2009 to grant public sector workers a basic right to or-
ganize, the amended provision excluded from coverage more cate-
gories of public sector workers than are recognized as legitimate to 
                                                      
217, 224, http://ojs.urepublicana.edu.co/index.php/revistarepublicana/arti-
cle/viewFile/214/191 [https://perma.cc/NK4R-T7DZ] (pointing to Articles 9, 53, 
and 93 of the Colombian Constitution establishing that the ILO Conventions rati-
fied by Colombia are part of its internal rules).  
63 See Thomas et al., supra note 57, at 268 (analyzing recent court decisions re-
lying on ILO standards as well as reports from ILO and the supervisory bodies).  
64 See Courtis, supra note 59, at 416–32 (discussing decisions from domestic 
courts in Argentina, Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala, and Bolivia). 
65 ILO governance does not allow for reservations to ratification by member 
states; however, flexibility is built into some conventions.  For instance, ILO Con-
vention 158, Termination of Employment, leaves to the ratifying state the choice 
between different methods of implementation in accordance with national law and 
practice—allowing for its provisions to be made effective by means of collective 
agreements, arbitration awards, or court decisions, as well as laws or regulations.  
ILO Convention (No. 158) Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative 
of the Employer, art. 1, June 22, 1982, 1412 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ILO Convention 
158].  Similarly, in ILO Convention 182, Worst Forms of Child Labour, certain prac-
tices are defined without qualification (e.g., slavery, sale and trafficking of children, 
debt bondage, and child pornography), but the definition of “work which, by its 
nature . . . is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children” is to be deter-
mined by national laws or regulations.  ILO Convention 182, supra note 5, art. 4.  
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exclude under the ILO Convention.66  Similarly, despite Peru’s rati-
fication of Convention 87 back in 1960, the domestic law governing 
contracts in the non-traditional export sectors undermines freedom 
of association by allowing companies to employ workers indefi-
nitely on consecutive short-term contracts.67 
Overall, however, the positive impact of ILO convention ratifi-
cation as a source for domestic labor laws has been considerable.  In 
part, this may reflect the reality that the ILO regularly provides sup-
port and assistance in drafting these labor codes and constitutional 
amendments, and many if not most reforms are aimed at areas of 
incompatibility between domestic law and ILO conventions.68  
Moreover, when the pace of domestic law adjustment lags, the ILO 
supervisory mechanisms have been additionally responsive in vari-
ous ways. 
 
3.1.2.  Supervisory Mechanisms   
 
A second area in which ILO activity influences the evolution of 
domestic labor law involves the work of the supervisory commit-
tees, notably the CEACR, the CAS, and the CFA.69  These three su-
pervisory committees publish regular reports, responding to sub-
missions from the member states regarding actions taken to comply 
with ratified conventions as a matter of law and practice.  In their 
constructively critical responses, the three committees consider 
comments on government submissions received from worker and 
employer organizations, as well as taking account of any separate 
                                                      
66 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO 
ARTICLE 18(2) OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 980/2005 WITH RESPECT TO THE 
PROTECTION OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE IN EL 
SALVADOR 13 (2009), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tra-
doc_145210.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG84-6DS2] (“[A] limited inconsistency be-
tween the text of the revised Article 47 of the El Salvadoran Constitution and Article 
2 of ILO Convention No 87 still exists.”). 
67 See ILAB, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF U.S. SUBMISSION 
2015-01 (PERU) i–ii (2016), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/Public_Re-
port_of_Review_of_US_Submission_2015-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/2937-SMXG] 
(discussing concern over the impact of Peru’s short-term contract policy on freedom 
of association). 
68 See ARTURO BRONSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW: 
CURRENT CHALLENGES 184 (2009).  
69 For an overview discussion of these three supervisory bodies, see supra notes 
24–27 and accompanying text.  
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ILO-authorized proceedings brought against member governments 
by employers’ or workers’ organizations or by other governments.70  
The ongoing attention from these supervisory bodies, reflecting con-
cerns about compliance with ILO conventions, lacks a traditional 
hard-law framework of monetary or other sanctions.  Nonetheless, 
the soft-law impact of the ILO’s longstanding, transparent, and well-
publicized reporting system can contribute in meaningful ways to 
changes in domestic laws or legal requirements. 
One illustration involves complaints lodged against Canada be-
fore the CFA alleging violations of workers’ freedom of association.  
In the three decades prior to 1982, there had been a total of sixteen 
complaints; between 1982 and 2002, there were sixty-two such com-
plaints brought to the CFA.71  During this later period, the Canadian 
courts were not overly receptive to worker complaints alleging em-
ployer interference with organizing and bargaining rights and pro-
tections. 
The labor movement turned to the ILO, where freedom of asso-
ciation and collective bargaining are considered fundamental hu-
man rights.72  When the Canadian Supreme Court substantially 
modified its prior restrictive interpretations of Canadian law start-
ing in 2001, it referred to the observations of ILO supervisory bodies 
as interpretive sources.73  Ultimately, the Canadian Supreme 
Court—in its groundbreaking 2007 and 2015 decisions—found that 
while the determinations of the CFA and CEACR were not binding, 
those determinations “shed light on the scope of” the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as it was intended to apply to both 
collective bargaining and the right to strike.74  In this respect, domes-
                                                      
70 See ILO Constitution, supra note 28, art. 24 (authorizing “representations” 
initiated by worker or employer organizations); id., art. 26 (authorizing “com-
plaints” brought by other member states). 
71 See Brian W. Burkett et al., Canada and the ILO: Freedom of Association Since 
1982, 10 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 231, 232 (2003). 
72 See id. at 248. 
73 See Judy Fudge, Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Free-
dom of Association, Collective Bargaining, and Strikes, 68 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 267, 
280 (2015) (discussing Canadian Supreme Court’s reliance on international labor 
law in interpreting freedom of association in the labor context); Langille, supra note 
50, at 60–61 (reporting that Canadian Supreme Court relied extensively on ILO 
norms in the 2007 and 2015 decisions). 
74 See Tonia Novitz, Connecting Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike: Eu-
ropean Dialogue with the ILO and its Potential Impact, 15 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
465, 466 (2009) (quoting 2007 Health Services majority decision); Langille, supra note 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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tic constitutional courts have given ILO supervisory body observa-
tions indirect legal effect by utilizing them when interpreting fun-
damental rights in their own constitutional instruments.75 
The Mexican labor movement has similarly raised concerns with 
the ILO supervisory bodies regarding “contracts of protection.”  
Mexican law does not require a negotiating party to demonstrate its 
representativeness of the workers, and as a result these contracts are 
often made without workers’ support or knowledge.76  Worker or-
ganizations have complained for many years to the ILO about the 
prevalence of protection contracts as violating their freedom of as-
sociation rights under Convention 87, and both the CEACR and the 
CAS have pressured Mexico to enact the legislative reforms needed 
to comply with the Convention.77  Mexico enacted several labor re-
forms in 2012 attempting to address these concerns (among others), 
                                                      
50, at 60–61 (reviewing both 2007 and 2015 decisions); see also supra notes 48–50 and 
accompanying text (discussing court’s reliance on observations from ILO supervi-
sory bodies in 2015 Saskatchewan decision). 
75 See Judy Fudge, Labour Rights as Human Rights: Turning Slogans into Legal 
Claims, 37 DALHOUSIE L.J. 601, 610–11 (2014). 
76 See ILAB, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF U.S. SUBMISSION 
2015-04 (MEXICO) i–ii (2016) [hereinafter ILAB, PUBLIC REPORT MEXICO], 
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/070816-Chedraui-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LEE8-FLQE] (issued pursuant to North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation). 
77 See CAS, Rep. No. 354, June 2009, Case No. 2536 (Mexico), ¶ 153, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50002:0::NO::P50002
_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2910546# [https://perma.cc/FEE7-B5ZW] (“The Com-
mittee . . . expects that the legislation will be amended to bring it into line with 
Convention No. 87.”); CAS, Interim Rep. No. 359, March 2011, Case No. 2694 (Mexico), 
¶ 899, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_ 
COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2911806 [https://perma.cc/FEE7-B5ZW] (“The Commit-
tee wishes to point out that on previous occasions it has requested certain legislative 
reforms to strengthen trade union rights . . . .”); Int’l Labour Standards 2015 (II), at 
77–78, ILC.104/III/2 (2015) [hereinafter ILC, Labour Standards 2015], 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2015-104-2).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8HSN-YPTM] (requesting the identification of reforms needed 
to bring the 2012 Labour Law into compliance with Convention No. 87); ILC, Rep. 
of the CEACR, Application of International Labour Standards 2016 (I), at 93, 
ILC.105/III(1A) (2016) [hereinafter CEACR, 2016 Rep.], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_448720.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFK7-HM26] 
(discussing efforts by CEACR and CAS to have Mexico revise its 2012 Labour Act).  
See generally Robin Alexander & Dan LaBotz, Mexico’s Labor Reform: A Workers’ De-
feat—For Now, NACLA REP. ON AM., at 49, 53 (2014) (noting little hope remains for 
“positive change from a government that has clearly demonstrated its commitment 
to pursue neoliberal policies and to attract foreign capital”). 
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including a requirement for greater transparency in collective bar-
gaining agreements and in the identity of negotiating unions, but 
these reforms have not yet had the desired effect.78  Since then, the 
President of Mexico has conceded that contracts of protection are 
problematic and has vowed to take steps that will address the issue 
and also to move toward ratification of Convention 98.79 
In Colombia, the ILO supervisory committees have repeatedly 
criticized the government for legal shortcomings in the areas of free-
dom of association and the right to organize.80  These critical reports 
and exchanges have been accompanied by an increasing ILO pres-
ence in the country, in the form of high-level missions and an ongo-
ing series of contacts.81  Although a lot remains to be done, especially 
                                                      
78 See ILAB, PUBLIC REPORT MEXICO, supra note 76, at 4–6 (noting there often are 
not online databases to view collective bargaining agreements in Mexico, and when 
there are, the databases are difficult to access). 
79 See Mexican Senate Approves Labour Law Reforms, INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL 
UNION, Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.industriall-union.org/mexican-senate-ap-
proves-labour-law-reforms-0 [https://perma.cc/S2X4-33ZK] (“[T]he Mexican Sen-
ate unanimously approved an initiative that amends Articles 107 and 123 of the 
Mexican Constitution, paving the way for a significant advance for workers in the 
country” but still has not voted on the President’s request to ratify Convention 98); 
Press Release to ILO’s Convention 98 Will Strengthen Workers’ Protections in Mexico 
(Dec. 3, 2015) http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Press-Releases/ILO-s-
Convention-98-Will-Strengthen-Workers-Protections-in-Mexico 
[https://perma.cc/Z7KS-H6BJ] (“The AFL-CIO welcomes the decision by the Pres-
ident of Mexico to bring Convention 98 of the [ILO] to the Mexican Senate for rati-
fication.”); CAS, Discussion: 2015, Publication: 104th ILC session, (2015), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3241939 [https://perma.cc/NDX7-5BBH] (“The [Mexican] Govern-
ment had been promising to ratify Convention No. 98 for the past three years . . . 
.”).  See generally Alexander & LaBotz, supra note 77, at 53. 
80 Between 1998 and 2009, Colombia appeared nine times on the CAS annual 
twenty-five worst-offenders list with respect to ILO Convention 87, requiring ef-
forts by the Colombian government before the Conference to explain its extended 
record of serious non-compliance.  See Lists of Individual Cases Before the CAS, 
1998-2016 (on file with the Author and the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law). 
81 See ILC, Rep. of CEACR, General Report and Observations Concerning Particu-
lar Countries, at 49, ILC.98/III(1A) (2008) [hereinafter CEACR, 2008 Rep.], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_103484.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ZU-GQPD] 
(discussing establishment of Colombian Tripartite Agreement on Freedom of As-
sociation and Democracy in June 2006 and setting up of Office of ILO representation 
in Colombia and ILO high-level mission in November 2007); M. Angeles Villareal, 
The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, 7 CURRENT POL. & 
ECON. SOUTH & CENT. AM. 358 (2014) (describing Colombian Action Plan Related to 
Labor Rights formalized in 2011 by United States and Colombia).  As discussed infra 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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in the area of practices and implementation, there have been 
changes in law—notably a 2011 reform of the criminal code, cover-
ing employers that undermine the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively82—and a 2012 executive decree substantially expanding 
collective bargaining rights for public sector employees.83  And, in 
Costa Rica, following identification of serious noncompliance with 
Convention 98 over a number of years,84 some reform of labor pro-
cedures has been reported since 2010.85 
While these illustrations all relate to Conventions 87 and 98, 
there also are numerous instances where governments have made 
substantial changes in domestic law following supervisory body 
pressure to comply with other fundamental conventions.86  Yet, as 
the examples from Colombia and Costa Rica make clear, the moni-
toring of ILO supervisory bodies may yield, at best, incremental 
                                                      
Section 3.2.2., some of this more aggressive monitoring arose in connection with the 
2007 Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Colombia.  Id. at 357. 
82 See Villareal, supra note 81, at 381. 
83 See ILC, Rep. of the CEACR, Application of International Labour Standards 2014 
(I), at 84–85, ILC.103/III(1A) (2014) [hereinafter CEACR, 2014 Rep.], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_235054.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5A6-YZY3] 
(providing Observation on Colombia and ILO Convention 98). 
84 Between 1999 and 2010, Costa Rica appeared seven times on the CAS annual 
twenty-five worst-offenders list with respect to ILO Convention 98, requiring con-
tinuing efforts by its government before the Conference to explain its record of se-
rious non-compliance.  See Lists of Individual Cases Before the CAS, supra note 80. 
85 See CEACR, 2014 Rep., supra note 83, at 87–89 (providing Observation on 
Costa Rica and ILO Convention 98); Law No. 9343, 25 January 2016 (Costa Rica), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/nat-
lex/docs/ELECTRONIC/101727/122702/F836437510/ley%209343%20 
COSTA%20RICA.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2VA-QSMK] (amending Costa Rican 
Labour Code to add protections on right to strike and right to collective bargaining 
that respond to and better comport with ILO norms.); see also Questionnaire Reply 
from Costa Rica to Author Preparing for Regional Congress 3 (translated Sept. 14, 
2016) (on file with Author); E-mail from Prof. Fernando Bolanos to Author (Sept. 
27, 2016) (on file with Author). 
86 See, e.g., CAS, A Dynamic and Impact Built on Decades of Dialogue and Persua-
sion, at 75–81 (2011) [hereinafter CAS, Dynamic and Impact], 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rj
a&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiu7dTDvKfWAh-
VplVQKHRXlCzsQFggmMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oit.org%2Fwcmsp5%
2Fgroups%2Fpublic%2F—-ed_norm%2F—-normes%2Fdocuments%2Fpublica-
tion%2Fwcms_154192.pdf&usg=AFQjCNELhO3 Ke_NRI3jLJOCyLXd-wSs-xQ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9CF-VPAD] (discussing Brazil’s substantial domestic law 
changes from 1995 to 2010, to comply with ILO Convention 111 on Nondiscrimina-
tion). 
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changes in law following many years of persistent review.  Indeed, 
such supervisory vigilance sometimes fails to result in any meaning-
ful changes in domestic labor laws to comply with ratified conven-
tions. 
In Guatemala, for instance, ILO committees have regularly 
sought to persuade the government to enact legislative reforms ad-
dressing problems of nonconformity with Conventions 87 and 98.87  
Legislative issues raised by the CEACR over the years include re-
strictions on the freedom to establish labor organizations, limita-
tions on the freedom to elect trade union leaders, restrictions on ac-
cess to trade union rights for public sector workers, and limitations 
on the right to strike.88  Although the legislature and the Ministry of 
Labour are now more actively considering ILO recommendations 
for reform, in a dialogue that includes worker and employer groups, 
the requested reforms have not yet been enacted.89 
Moreover, in Bolivia, a 2014 law kept the official minimum 
working age at fourteen—as required under Convention 138—but 
permitted children to work at age ten, provided they are supervised 
by a parent and are attending school, and to work at age twelve un-
der contract, again subject to parental authorization and school at-
tendance.90  Bolivia is the only nation that approves legal employ-
ment at such young ages.  Children working regularly make up as 
                                                      
87 Between 1999 and 2016, Guatemala appeared on the CAS annual twenty-
five-worst-offenders list, on thirteen occasions for ILO Convention 87 and on three 
occasions for ILO Convention 98.  No other country in the Americas matches such 
a record of noncompliance for these two freedom-of-association-based fundamen-
tal conventions.  Lists of Individual Cases Before the CAS, supra note 80. 
88 See, e.g., ILC, Rep. of the CEACR, General Report and Observations Concerning 
Particular Countries, at 154, ILC.99/III(1A) (2010) [hereinafter CEACR, 2010 Rep.], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_123424.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7WJ-WRPE]; 
CEACR, 2014 Rep., supra note 83, at 115; CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 71.  See 
Gerda van Roozendaal, The Diffusion of Labour Standards: The Case of the U.S. and 
Guatemala, 3 POL. & GOVERNANCE 18, 20, 25–26 (2015); see also Luis Linares et al., 
Foreign Trade and Agricultural Employment in Guatemala, in SHARED HARVEST: 
AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 244 (David Cheong, Marion Jansen, and 
Ralf Peters eds., 2013) (discussing issues involving ILO conventions on the elimina-
tion of forced labor, the abolition of child labor, and elimination of discrimination 
in Guatemala). 
89 CEACR, 2010 Rep., supra note 88, at 71; see van Roozendaal, supra note 88, at 
26 (summarizing recent reports from U.S. Labor and State Departments and 
Cingranelli-Richards (“CIRI”) Human Rights Data project). 
90 Malavika Krishnan, Advancing Backwards: Bolivia’s Child Labour Laws, COUNS. 
ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.coha.org/advancing-back-
wards-bolivias-child-labor-law/ [https://perma.cc/GV35-2FU9]; Aidan 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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much as 35% of the Bolivian workforce, and over half are under the 
age of fourteen, often laboring in dangerous occupations such as 
sugar cane harvesting and underground mining.91  In addition, 
about 40% of children enrolled in school are not attending, with pov-
erty and indigenous status the most important factors accounting 
for their failure to attend.92 
Child labor laws are notoriously difficult to monitor and enforce 
in practice, because so much of child labor is performed in the infor-
mal economy.93  The ILO continues to devote considerable attention 
to the challenges posed by the informal economy for the rights of 
workers, including the challenge of abolishing child labor.94  Still, 
                                                      
McQuade, Bolivia’s Child Labour Law Shames Us All, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-mat-
ters/2014/jul/25/bolivia-child-labour-law-exploitation-slavery 
[https://perma.cc/AL73-UR45] (“Bolivia has become the first country to legalise 
child labour, reducing the minimum age of employment from 14 years old to just 
10.”).  In 2015, the CAS urged the government to repeal these provisions.  ILC, CAS, 
Extracts from the Record of Proceedings, at 128, ILC 104 (2015), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-normes/docu-
ments/publication/wcms_412826.pdf [https://perma.cc/38WJ-F78S]. 
91 See ILAB, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR REPORTS: 
BOLIVIA, MINIMAL ADVANCEMENT—EFFORTS MADE BUT CONTINUED LAW THAT 
DELAYED ADVANCEMENT (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/im-
ages/ilab/child-labor/Bolivia.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8HZ-9LQ7]; Krishnan, su-
pra note 90.  
92 See Francesco Grigoli & Giacomo Sbrana, Determinant and Dynamics of School-
ing and Child Labor in Bolivia 17 (World Bank Poverty Reduction & Econ. Mgmt. 
Network, Working Paper No. 5534, 2011), https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/228286599_Determinants_and_Dynamics_of_Schooling_and_Child_La-
bor_in_Bolivia [https://perma.cc/7BL5-LLMY]. 
93 See Anne Trebilcock, International Labour Standards and the Informal Economy, 
in LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL: UN PATRIMOINE POUR L’AVENIR. 
MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE NICOLAS VALTICOS 585, 608–09, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-normes/docu-
ments/publication/wcms_087423.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DE5-L6JJ] (stating child 
labor is most often found in the informal economy, a fact that presents challenges 
to its effective abolition); ILO, The International Programme on the Elimination of Child 
Labour: What it Is and What it Does, at 7, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rj
a&uact=8&ved=0ahUKE-
wifo52qu6fWAhXpy1QKHT_KB7gQFggxMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ilo.or
g%2Fipecinfo%2Fproduct%2Fdownload.do%3Ftype%3Ddocu-
ment%26id%3D13334&usg=AFQjCNF780x7Go0S8Su2jH7twbOT2VSqGA 
[https://perma.cc/H3JV-B57R] (discussing agriculture, small-scale mining, and 
domestic labour as three prominent aspects of the child labor problem).  
94 See ILO, Recommendation No. 204, Transition from the Informal to the Formal 
Economy, arts. 11, 16 (2015); Trebilcock, supra note 93, at 585 (presenting interna-
tional conventions targeted at eliminating child labor). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
34 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:1 
even with these practical challenges, Bolivia’s 2014 statute, tolerat-
ing legal employment at ages ten to thirteen, undermines the com-
mitment to Convention 138 as a matter of law—as distinct from 
practice. 
 
3.1.3.  Partnering Efforts.  
 
A final area of direct and substantial ILO influence on the devel-
opment of domestic laws is the ILO’s partnering efforts with differ-
ent governments to provide education, training, and technical assis-
tance.  These partnerships can facilitate the government’s efforts to 
impose domestic protections—sometimes through actual changes in 
the law and often through changes in domestic legal practices. 
One example of a partnership effort was in Brazil, where in 2008 
the ILO began a four-year program to help end child labor in the 
state of Bahia.95  The objectives of the $4.9 million project included:  
expanding the knowledge base about child labor; strengthening po-
litical and institutional frameworks for the prevention of child labor; 
increasing the capacity of public and private actors to help eradicate 
child labor in Bahia; and enhancing the state social safety network 
to victims of child labor.96 
In addition to achieving its goal of removing or preventing 
14,000 children from getting pulled into the worst forms of labor, the 
program was also effective in bringing together Brazil’s various 
agencies and initiatives to address the complex problem of child la-
bor.  Examples of the collaborative practices observed in Bahia in-
cluded:  (1) the passage of a law restricting state funding and tax 
incentives for employers that do not adopt decent work practices, 
notably combating child labor as one of its standards; (2) the expan-
sion of the national child labour eradication program (“PETI”) 
through an active, house-to-house search effort conducted by a col-
lection of social actors (e.g., education, social assistance, and health 
care groups) to identify children working or at risk of working; and 
                                                      
95 See ILO, Evaluation Summary, Support to National Efforts Towards a Child La-
bour-Free State, Bahia-Brazil (Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter ILO, Evaluation Summary], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_mas/—-eval/docu-
ments/publication/wcms_175461.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC3B-FH3A] (providing 
project summary and reporting that the project shows important progress both at 
national and state level). 
96 Id. at 2. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
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(3) the surveillance of the Labor Prosecutor’s Office, in conjunction 
with the State Government of Bahia, to ensure the fulfillment of their 
obligations to combat child labor.97 
A second example is in Chile, where, despite ratification by the 
year 2000 of the two core child labor conventions and the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, progress has been slow in both 
law and practice.98  Since 2002, the Chilean Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare has partnered with the ILO on projects to assess the 
magnitude and characteristics of child and adolescent labor, in an 
effort to educate civil servants and construct policies that will erad-
icate child labor and assure adequate working conditions for ado-
lescents.99  The initial survey in 2003 and a second survey conducted 
in 2012 each identified over 100,000 children and adolescents work-
ing in unacceptable conditions.100  These national surveys, and the 
dialogue they created between ILO specialists and government offi-
cials, have helped focus attention on developing a stronger enforce-
ment process in Chile, although much work remains to be done.101 
A further illustration of ILO partnering efforts involves Nicara-
gua, specifically the Better Work Nicaragua program launched in 
                                                      
97 Id. at 4. 
98 See Jean Grugel & Enrique Peruzotti, The Domestic Politics of International Hu-
man Rights Law: Implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Ecuador, 
Chile, and Argentina, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 178, 190 (2012). 
99 See, e.g., ILO ET AL., CHILD AND ADOLESCENT LABOUR IN FIGURES: SYNTHESIS OF 
THE FIRST NATIONAL SURVEY AND REGISTRY OF ITS WORST FORMS 6 (2004) [hereinafter 
ILO, CHILD LABOUR IN FIGURES], http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/down-
load.do?type=document&id=1219 [https://perma.cc/6LLK-65LZ] (presenting the 
magnitude and characteristics of child and adolescent labor in Chile); ILO, A CHILD 
IN THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR, A STORY TO FOLLOW: THE CENTRALIZED 
REGISTRATION AND INTERVENTION SYSTEM (CHILE) 1 (2010), 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationre-
sources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_15095/lang—en/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M657-T68F] (promoting the Centralized Registration and Inter-
vention System for the Worst Forms of Child Labour, which was created in 2003 by 
the Chilean National Service for Minors with support from the ILO). 
100 See ILO, CHILD LABOUR IN FIGURES, supra note 99, at 10–11.  “Unacceptable 
work” is defined as children working below age twelve; from twelve to fourteen, if 
the work interferes with their school attendance and studying and/or exceeds thir-
teen hours a week; or from fifteen to seventeen, if the work interferes with school 
attendance and exceeds twenty hours per week.  Id. 
101 See generally César F. Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Compliance: Les-
sons from Chile, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 343 (2012) (calling for more participa-
tory and cooperative regulatory processes and the use of persuasive as well as pu-
nitive enforcement orientations in order to obtain better compliance results). 
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2011 by the Nicaraguan government and the Nicaraguan Associa-
tion of Textile Manufacturing.102  The Better Work program is a col-
laborative effort around the world, catalyzed by the ILO and the In-
ternational Finance Corporation, to realize workers’ rights in the 
garment industry by educating workers and influencing the laws 
and policies of governments and businesses.  The annual reports for 
Nicaragua have been able to corroborate government findings of 
progress to root out child labor and protect freedom of association, 
although these reports also have uncovered instances of noncompli-
ance with Conventions 87 and 98.103 
A final recent example of partnering efforts involves El Salvador, 
which in October of 2015 became part of an EU-funded ILO pilot 
program to strengthen the capacity of national public administra-
tions to apply the eight fundamental ILO conventions.104  This pro-
gram, which is tied to EU trade preferences for the identified coun-
tries, serves as a transition to considering the role of trade 
agreements when promoting changes in domestic labor laws. 
                                                      
102 See Nicaragua: Our Programme, BETTERWORK, https://better-
work.org/where-we-work/nicaragua/better-work-nicaragua/ 
[https://perma.cc/JG5G-3WKG] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017); Jennifer Bair & Gary 
Gereffi, Towards Better Work in Central America: Nicaragua and the CAFTA Context, in 
TOWARDS BETTER WORK: UNDERSTANDING LABOUR IN APPAREL GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
251, 251-85 (Arianna Rossi, Amy Luinstra, & John Pickles eds., 2014). 
103 See ILO & Int’l Fin. Corp. [IFC], Better Work Nicaragua: Garment Industry 2nd 
Compliance Synthesis Report (Mar. 2015), https://betterwork.org/blog/portfo-
lio/better-work-nicaragua-2nd-compliance-synthesis-report-march-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZZ4-B39L]; Bair & Gereffi, supra note 102.  There are interest-
ing parallels between these “public regulation” coordinated efforts, involving the 
ILO and national governments, and “private regulation” partnering efforts, involv-
ing consultation and technical assistance between multinational brands and their 
suppliers.  See Richard M. Locke, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: 
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 123, 154 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2013).  
104 See, e.g., Generalised Scheme of Preferences for the European Commission Direc-
torate-General for Trade (Aug. 1, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/coun-
tries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/ 
[https://perma.cc/HAF6-K7JE] (discussing GSP background materials).  See also 
Joint Staff Working Document on the EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance (‘GSP+’) Covering the Period 2014-2015, at 115–118, 
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/european_commis-
sion._2016._report_on_the_generalised_scheme_of_preferences_during_the_pe-
riod_2014-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS2V-FTKF] (discussing El Salvador’s rat-
ification of eight ILO Conventions on labor standards); EU, EU-Funded Projects 
Supporting GSP Beneficiary Countries, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-
clib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155843.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C7P-DSKZ] (provid-
ing effective date for El Salvador’s two-year pilot project).  
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Importantly, trade-agreement-related changes may also involve 
a role for the ILO.  That role may be in the form of ILO technical 
assistance and support during the negotiation or monitoring of 
trade labor provisions.  Additionally, it is often because the labor 
provisions include linkages to ILO norms. 
 
3.2.  ILO Norms and Trade Agreements 
 
Prior to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(“NAALC”), which is a side agreement to NAFTA, in the early 
1990s, bilateral and regional trade agreements did not contain labor 
provisions.  This reflected a widespread view—particularly from ex-
porting countries—that the challenge of securing labor standards 
protections from a trading partner had little to do with negotiating 
for the reduction of trade barriers between nations.105  This mindset 
has changed dramatically in the past two decades.  On a global scale, 
the number of free trade agreements (“FTAs”) containing labor pro-
visions increased from four in 1995 to seventy-six as of December 
2015; nearly half of them came into existence after 2008.106  In the 
Americas, the United States has played a pivotal role in negotiating 
                                                      
105 Outside this negotiated context, the United States’ GSP regime requires the 
President to consider—when designating a country as a beneficiary—whether that 
country is “taking steps” to accord its workers internationally recognized workers’ 
rights.  See William A. Douglas et al., An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of 
Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards, U.S. Trade Laws, and NGOs, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 273, 276 
(2004).  The United States’ GSP regime is a recognized exception to the WTO Most 
Favored Nation principles that essentially prohibits differential tariff treatment be-
tween WTO members.  See Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and 
Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 203, 213–14 (2007).  The design and inclusion of labor provisions in GSP pro-
grams is unilateral (i.e., not subject to negotiation between the United States and 
the implementing country) and enforcement is completely discretionary on the part 
of the implementing government.  Id. at 215–16.  In addition, the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative has at times been less than enthusiastic about monitoring and 
enforcing the GSP.  See Douglas et al., supra at 277. 
106 See ILO, STUDIES ON GROWTH WITH EQUITY: ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR 
PROVISIONS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS 1 (Jonas Aissi et al., eds., 
2016) [hereinafter ILO, ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—-inst/docu-
ments/publication/wcms_498944.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3TC-6DBB]; Interna-
tional Institute for Labour Studies, ILO, Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements 1 
(Nov. 6, 2013) [hereinafter ILO, Social Dimensions of FTAs], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—-inst/docu-
ments/publication/wcms228965.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D5T-CFGS]. 
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these provisions—in regional trade agreements like the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”)107 and the controver-
sial proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)108 as well as bilat-
eral agreements with Chile (2003), Peru (2006), Colombia (2012), and 
Panama (2012). 
 
3.2.1.  Positive Elements of Linkage to ILO Norms.  
 
As a party to most FTAs in the Americas,109 the United States is 
persistent about including a commitment to international standards 
on labor rights.  This persistence is primarily the result of legislative 
branch pressure.  Congress has been generally uninterested in rati-
fying ILO standards for domestic application,110 but since the Trade 
Act of 2002, Congress has required that U.S. trade agreements aim 
                                                      
107 This 2005 agreement covers trade relations involving the United States and 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua.  See Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, CAFTA Policy Brief (July 2005) https://ustr.gov/ar-
chive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Re-
gional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file58_7878.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T8SM-LR4Q] (praising “tough, effective enforcement provi-
sions” from U.S. perspective).  
108 This 2015 agreement covers twelve countries—including the United States, 
Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Peru in the Americas.  President Obama was influential 
in negotiating the TPP, but in January 2017, President Trump declared that the 
United States would not join the agreement.  Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-
Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-
nafta.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/U4DN-8VT6]. 
109 Canada has separate bilateral agreements with some countries, e.g., Cana-
dian Agreement on Labour Cooperation with Peru (2009) and Colombia (2012).  See 
ILO, Social Dimensions of FTAs, supra note 106, at 33. 
110 Congress’s opposition to such influence in its own legal system is an aspect 
of American exceptionalism, discussed in the Introduction.  See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text.  The United States has ratified fourteen conventions, twelve of 
which are in force.  This includes two of the eight fundamental conventions each 
ratified since 1990: ILO Convention 182, supra note 5; and ILO Convention (No. 105) 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, Jan. 17, 1959, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 [herein-
after ILO Convention 105].  For other conventions ratified since 1990, see ILO Con-
vention (No. 150) Concerning Labour Administration: Role, Functions and Organ-
isation, June 26, 1978, 1201 U.N.T.S. 179; ILO Convention (No. 160) Concerning 
Labour Statistics, June 25, 1985, 1505 U.N.T.S. 39, and ILO Convention 176, supra 
note 33.  
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“to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to pro-
mote respect for core labor standards,”111 and has defined core labor 
standards to track fundamental ILO norms.112  Labor provisions of 
U.S. trade agreements now regularly feature linkages to ILO norms.  
Thus, for instance, the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA, 2004) and the agreement with Chile (2003) specify that the 
parties shall “strive to ensure” that labor principles internationally 
recognized under the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work (Declaration) are protected by their domes-
tic laws.113  Labor provisions in more recent U.S. trade agreements 
with Colombia (2012), Panama (2012), and Peru (2006) go somewhat 
further, providing that each party shall “adopt and maintain in its 
statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder,” the rights “as 
stated in the ILO Declaration.”114 
These linkages have encouraged countries to push domestic la-
bor law reform toward compliance with international standards, of-
ten as a condition of having the agreements ratified in the United 
States.115  Accordingly, changes in national labor laws have occurred 
                                                      
111 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(11)(C), 16 Stat. 994 (2002); 
see also § 2102(c)(2) (requiring the President to establish consultative mechanisms 
among parties to trade agreements in order to accomplish this objective). 
112 See id. at § 2113(6) (defining core labor standards to include protection for 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labor and 
child labor, and acceptable working conditions regarding wages, hours, and safety 
and health). 
113 Central American Free Trade Agreement, art. 16.1, U.S.-Costa Rica-Dom. 
Rep.-El. Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Jan. 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA], 
http://ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [https://perma.cc/67N7-PPSW]; Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Chile., art. 18.1, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile 
Agreement], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agree-
ments/fta/chile/asset_upload _file853_4012.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5B2-
C243]. 
114 Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., art. 17.2, May 15, 2012 [herein-
after U.S.-Colom. Agreement], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/up-
loads/agreements/fta/colombia/asset_upload_file993_10146.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FV4U-WKSX]; Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., art. 
16.2, Oct. 31, 2012 [hereinafter U.S.-Pan. Agreement], https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/uploads/agreements/fta/panama/asset_upload_file403_10354.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UV2K-T2JF]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 17.2, Apr. 
12, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Peru Agreement], https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file73_9496.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VW8N-F3KK]. 
115 See ILO, ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS, supra note 106, at 3 (discussing 
effective enforcement of labor rights and reforms through pre-treaty and post treaty 
ratification requirements). 
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in response to concerns raised pursuant to these agreements by the 
U.S. Congress, the U.S. Trade Representative, or the U.S. Labor Ad-
visory Committee.  In Peru, apart from the previously described 
changes to the laws regulating strikes, presidential decrees and ex-
isting law have addressed the use of temporary employment and 
outsourcing arrangements and protection against anti-union activi-
ties.116  In Panama, executive decrees and new labor laws created a 
specific bureau to combat child labor and protect young workers, 
and also to remove restrictions on collective bargaining rights and 
the right to strike in the country’s export processing zones.117 And 
in Colombia, a national labor rights Action Plan was announced in 
2011, dealing especially with preventing anti-union violence, limit-
ing the evasion of national laws, and enabling stronger enforce-
ment.118  By 2014 there had been meaningful progress under the Ac-
tion Plan, including the enactment of laws that strengthen workers’ 
rights protections and the hiring of hundreds of new labor inspec-
tors, although problems of implementation remain.119 
As noted above, the labor provisions in these trade agreements 
refer not to particular ILO Conventions but to the 1998 ILO Declara-
tion.  This is not the place to revisit the debate among legal scholars 
as to whether the Declaration’s emphasis on a limited number of 
conventions,120 or its focus on “promot[ing] and realiz[ing] the prin-
ciples concerning the fundamental rights” in those conventions, 
                                                      
116 ILO, Social Dimensions of FTAs, supra note 106, at 38 (citing Inside U.S. Trade, 
United States, Peru Reach Labor Deal, Administration Vows to Fight for All FTAs (Aug. 
10, 2007), https://insidetrade.com [https://perma.cc/L7M7-VSKP]).  
117 Id. at 39; see MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30981, PANAMA: 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND U.S. RELATIONS 19-21 (2012). 
118 See ILO, Social Dimensions of FTAs, supra note 106, at 39. 
119 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, UPDATE: THE COLOMBIAN 
LABOR ACTION PLAN, THREE YEARS LATER 1 (2014), https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/Colombia%20Labor%20Action%20 Plan%20update%20final-
April2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TER-ERJX]. 
120 The Declaration focuses on eight conventions deemed “fundamental”: ILO 
Convention 29, supra note 32  (addressing forced labor); ILO Convention 105, supra 
note 110 (same); ILO Convention 138, supra note 5 (addressing child labor); ILO 
Convention 182, supra note 5 (same) ; ILO Convention 87, supra note 5 (addressing 
freedom of association and collective bargaining); ILO Convention 98, supra note 5 
(same); ILO Convention 100, supra note 32 (addressing equal remuneration for 
women); ILO Convention 111, supra note 32 (addressing nondiscrimination in em-
ployment).  
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have damaged the efficacy of the traditional ILO supervisory sys-
tem.121  For present purposes, it is enough to describe briefly why 
the Declaration’s central role in trade agreement labor provisions 
has contributed constructively to the development of domestic labor 
laws in Latin America. 
First, the promotional focus of the Declaration includes a prag-
matic recognition that the ILO has an obligation to help member 
states achieve compliance with these fundamental principles—by 
offering technical assistance and advice and by assisting members’ 
efforts to secure enhanced economic and social development.122  
This pragmatic approach has encouraged countries to re-elaborate 
their laws and practices as they seek to conform to the fundamental 
principles, and relatedly to secure outside financial and technical as-
sistance in support of their efforts.123 
Second, the Declaration, through its treatment of economic 
growth and social justice as closely interrelated, in effect identifies 
                                                      
121 Compare Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor 
Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work?, 36 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 256–63 (2004) (stating that the 
Declaration has had detrimental effects on the ILO’s supervising and monitoring 
mechanisms), with Francis Maupin, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 
1998 Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INTL L. 439, 
443–44 (2005) [hereinafter Maupin, Revitalization Not Retreat] (contending that the 
Declaration has helped overcome limitations in the existing supervisory mecha-
nisms), and Brian Langille, Core Labour Rights—The True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 
EUR. J. INTL L. 409, 420–27 (2005) [hereinafter Langille, Core Labour Rights] (question-
ing the validity of the assertion that the Declaration has had mainly negative effects 
on the supervisory system). 
122 ILC, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art.3, 37 
I.L.M. 1237, (June 18, 1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration], http://www.ilo.org/dec-
laration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—en/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2YVS-EXDN]; ILO, Independent Evaluation of the ILO’s Strategies 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, at ix, (ILO ed., 2015) [hereinafter ILO 
Strategies], http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_mas/—-
eval/documents/publication/wcms_314442.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3H4-6S9G]; 
Ana Virginia Moreira Gomes, The Effect of ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work on the Evolution of Legal Policy in Brazil: An Analysis 
of Freedom of Association 88-99 (2009) (unpublished M.S.L. thesis, University of 
Toronto) (on file with the Author). 
123 See Maupin, Revitalization Not Retreat, supra note 121, at 446 (discussing 
ILO’s obligation to assist member countries in respecting and realizing the funda-
mental principles and rights through technical cooperation and advisory services); 
ILO Strategies, supra note 122, at 12–28; Jean-Marc Siroën, Labour Provisions in Pref-
erential Trade Agreements: Current Practice and Outlook, 152 INT’L LAB. REV. 85, 88–89 
(2013) (chronicling the Cambodian government’s leverage of quotas to assist ILO 
monitoring). 
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the fundamental or core labor rights as human rights.124 This has 
helped make the fundamental principles an essential element of the 
dialogue involving trade and investment arrangements between 
governments.  In addressing how “to ensure that trade liberalization 
upholds or improves labor standards, rather than put[ting] them at 
risk,”125 national leaders contemplating trade agreements have come 
to appreciate that respect for the Declaration should be part of their 
efforts, and to worry that they may be disadvantaged if they fail to 
take sufficient action in this area.126 
Finally, and relatedly, ILO adoption of the Declaration has been 
followed by a torrent of new ratifications for these eight fundamen-
tal conventions.  Historically, ILO member States have ratified the 
eight conventions at a combined level over 90%, and 30% of those 
ratifications occurred between 1999 and 2006.127  The enormous in-
crease in ratifications presumably reflects a combination of strong 
encouragement and removal of obstacles, due to trade agreement 
factors; the Declaration’s requirement that States report every year 
on why they have not ratified and their consideration of the ILO’s 
                                                      
124 ILO Declaration, supra note 122, at pmbl. 5.  See Langille, Core Labour Rights, 
supra note 121, at 419 (discussing the centrality of social justice as the goal and pre-
condition to the creation of durable economies and societies); Janice R. Bellace, The 
ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 17 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. 
& INDUS. REL. 269, 269–70 (2001) (attributing ILO’s implementation of the ‘Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ to the concerted effort to focus 
on those conventions that protect fundamental human rights). 
125 ILO, Social Dimensions of FTAs, supra note 106, at 6. 
126 ILO Strategies, supra note 122, at 42–43; MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 3–4 (2016); Eric Gravel & Quentin Delpech, ILO, The Comments of the 
ILO’s Supervisory Bodies: Usefulness in the Context of the Sanction-Based Dimension of 
Labour Provisions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements 7-12, 26–27, (2013), 
http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—-inst/documents/publi-
cation/wcms_207860.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UTQ-N2FJ]. 
127 The 187 member states could ratify up to 1496 times for the eight funda-
mental conventions.  Author calculations based on ILO website data indicate a com-
bined 1365 ratifications for the fundamental conventions; 408 of these occurred be-
tween 1999 and 2006.  See also Kahn-Nisser, supra note 31, at 525 (reporting on the 
impact of the Declaration in forty-five studied European countries: thirty-nine of 
forty-five had ratified seven or eight of the fundamental conventions by 2002, com-
pared with seventeen countries in 1998, twenty-four in 1999, thirty in 2000, and 
thirty-six in 2001).  
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offer of technical and financial assistance;128 and perhaps even a con-
cern that the ILO might begin to supervise the Declaration.129 
 
3.2.2.  Limitations on the Linkage to ILO Norms.   
 
Notwithstanding this elevation of ILO norms in the labor provi-
sions of trade agreements, the impact on domestic labor laws from 
such trade agreement provisions may be somewhat limited.  One 
important factor is that trade agreement labor provisions are usually 
drafted to avoid a specific commitment to compliance with ILO con-
ventions.  Over 70% of trade-related labor provisions make refer-
ence to ILO instruments, but as noted above, the vast majority of 
these incorporations are made explicitly and exclusively to the 1998 
Declaration, not to particular Conventions.130  The labor provisions 
language in recent U.S. trade agreements involving the Americas—
including the now-shelved TPP—includes a footnote stating une-
quivocally that the parties’ obligations to adopt and maintain prac-
tices consistent with ILO norms “refer only to the ILO Declara-
tion.”131  The language creating linkage to ILO norms has been 
strengthened from “strive to ensure” to “adopt and maintain,”132 but 
the reference point remains the Declaration rather than the underly-
ing Conventions. 
Although inclusion of the Declaration has been beneficial in cer-
tain broad ways previously described, its use as a reference point is 
problematic from the standpoint of domestic labor law reform. For 
a start, the exact scope and meaning of the Declaration are unclear. 
                                                      
128 See ILO Declaration, supra note 122, art.3, annex II.B.1.–3. (providing assis-
tance to member countries through operational and budgetary resources to attain 
objectives of the convention). 
129 See id., annex II.–III. (stipulating annual follow-up with member countries 
that have not ratified all the fundamental conventions). 
130 ILO, ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS, supra note 106, at 2; ILO, Social Di-
mensions of FTAs, supra note 106, at 107 (reporting that only 15% of all agreements 
with labor provisions refer specifically to ILO fundamental conventions). 
131 U.S.-Colom. Agreement, supra note 114, art.17.2 n.1; U.S.-Pan. Agreement, 
supra 114, art.16.2 n.1; U.S.-Peru Agreement, supra 114, art. 17.2 n.2; Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, opened for signature, Austl.- Brunei-Can.-Chile-Japan-Ma-
lay.-Mex.-N.Z.-Peru-Sing.-Viet., art.19.3.1 n.3, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP Agree-
ment], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MFP2-LU7M]  
132  See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying texts. 
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The drafting history indicates that a number of governments as well 
as the ILO legal advisor described the Declaration as “refer[ring] to 
adherence to principles and values and not to specific Conven-
tions,”133 a distinction that invites questions as to its precise or de-
finitive content.134 Further, a commitment to principles appears less 
binding than a commitment to adhere to Conventions that a state 
has ratified. Because the Declaration applies universally to all mem-
ber states as an aspect of ILO membership, including member states 
that have not ratified some or many of the fundamental conventions, 
it cannot obligate members to uphold all the standards in these eight 
Conventions.135 
A related consideration is that the 1998 Declaration is not subject 
to monitoring by the ILO supervisory bodies in the way that Con-
ventions are.  The absence of close and continuing interpretive guid-
ance from these supervisory bodies means that it is more difficult to 
achieve consistency of meaning for the principles set forth in the 
Declaration.  This, in turn, invites and may even demand more de-
centralized interpretations of the international norms, perhaps effec-
tively diminishing their strength as legal standards, or “law.”136 
I do not mean to suggest that ILO supervisory positions constru-
ing the meaning or scope of Conventions are consistently followed 
by all national courts. Some conventions, perhaps especially those 
drafted and promulgated as relatively general texts, have given rise 
to good faith differences in interpretation at the national level.137  
                                                      
133  Michael A. Cabin, Note, Labor Rights in the Peru Agreement: Can Vague Prin-
ciples Yield Concrete Change? 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (2009) (reporting on re-
marks by government representatives from United States, Chile, Sweden, France, 
and Brazil); see also id. (describing similar remarks by ILO legal advisor).  
134  Id. at 1047, 1049, 1074–1076; ILO, Social Dimensions of FTAs, supra note 106, 
at 107.  
135 Cabin, supra note 133, at 1074–75. 
136 See Jordi Agustí-Panareda, Franz Christian Ebert & Desirée LeClercq, ILO 
Labour Standards and Trade Agreements: A Case for Consistency, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 347, 363–67 (2015) (discussing the uncertainty of the scope and interpreta-
tion of ILO Declaration’s principles upon independent application by different 
trade bodies). 
137 Compare Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme 
Court of Justice], 7/6/2016, “Orellano Francisco Daniel c. Correo Oficial de la Re-
pública Argentina / juicio sumarisimo,” La Ley [L.L.] (2016-49-55) (Arg.), 
http://www.saij.gob.ar/corte-suprema-justicia-nacion-federal-ciudad-autonoma-
buenos-aires-orellano-francisco-daniel-correo-oficial-republica-argentina-sa-jui-
cio-sumarisimo-fa16000089-2016-06-07/123456789-980-0006-1ots-eupmocsollaf 
[https://perma.cc/TK6L-D4GD] (stating that based on the interpretation of ILO 
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Further, the increased use of fundamental ILO Conventions by pri-
vate actors as well as governments may make it more difficult to 
maintain a coherent interpretive practice regarding these conven-
tions.138  And the recent questions raised by the ILO Employers 
Group regarding the right to strike indicate that prevailing CEACR 
and CFA interpretations are susceptible to challenge from inside the 
tripartite governing structure.139 
Nonetheless, the current levels of difference or disagreement 
about how the textual language of Conventions should be applied 
                                                      
Convention 87, the right to strike belongs to the organization and not the individ-
ual), with Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 8 marzo 2016, “Ac-
tionline Chile c. Claudio Yutronic Rojas y Rodrigo Carmona Millanao,” Rol de la 
causa: 28919-2015 (Chile) (on file with Author) (rejecting the position taken by em-
ployer parties in reliance on ILO Convention 87, that the right to strike belongs only 
to organizations).  With respect to the right to strike, the ILO supervisory bodies’ 
interpretations of ILO Convention 87 on this issue may be capacious enough to sup-
port national laws that point in either direction—laws protecting the collective right 
to industrial action through trade unions or workers’ organizations as well as laws 
recognizing that strikes by individual workers may be part of freedom of associa-
tion rights under the Convention.  See generally ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: 
DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF 
THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO ¶¶ 520, 524 (5th ed. 2006). 
138 Niklas Bruun, Understanding Fundamental Labor Rights: Achieving Social Jus-
tice Through Interpretation, in ENSURING COHERENCE IN FUNDAMENTAL LABOR RIGHTS 
CASE LAW: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 40, 46 (Social Justice Expertise Center 
ed., 2016), http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/09/SJEC-Conference-booklet-Final-15-September.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UTB7-PMQQ].  See James J. Brudney, Envisioning Enforcement of 
Freedom of Association Standards in Corporate Codes: A Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus? 
33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 555, 559-60 (2012) (describing how multinational corpo-
rations use varied formulations to invoke ILO conventions and principles in their 
corporate codes).  In addition to corporate codes, the International Finance Corpo-
ration’s Sustainability Framework requires its clients to apply certain performance 
standards “to manage . . . social risks and impacts so that development opportuni-
ties are enhanced.”  IFC, IFC Sustainability Framework: Policy and Performance Stand-
ards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, Access to Information Policy, at 14 (Jan. 
1, 2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/con-
nect/b9dacb004a73e7a8a273fff998895a12/IFC_Sustainability_+Framework.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/HN6A-ZTB3].  The performance standard de-
voted to labor and working conditions includes requirements that are guided in 
important respects by the ILO’s eight fundamental conventions.  See Craig Moss, et 
al., IFC & Soc. Accountability Int’l [SAI], Measure and Improve Your Labor Standards 
Performance: Performance Standard 2 Handbook for Labor and Working Conditions, at 15 
(2012) https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/con-
nect/177c370048865808b3def36a6515bb18/SAI_IFC_LaborHandbook.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES [https://perma.cc/ML6S-LBZ5].  
139 Bruun, supra note 138, at 45–46; Claire La Hovary, Showdown at the ILO? A 
Historical Perspective on the Employers’ Group’s 2012 Challenge to the Right to Strike, 42 
INDUS. L.J. 338 (2013). 
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can be understood as fairly characteristic of rule-of-law regimes at 
both national and international levels.140  In this regard, the debates 
and controversies about Convention interpretations that have been 
developed over decades by ILO supervisory bodies are occurring 
against a background of stability and legitimacy emanating from the 
ILO supervisory structure, which includes the CAS as well as the 
CEACR and CFA.  Such a background is unlikely to be comparably 
established with respect to the scope and meaning of the Declara-
tion. 
 
3.2.3.  Limitations Due to the Architecture of   
Trade Agreement Labor Provisions.  
 
Apart from the challenge of requiring commitment to ILO prin-
ciples (as distinct from ILO Conventions), certain structural aspects 
of the labor provisions have impeded efforts to incorporate interna-
tional norms into domestic labor law.  First, these trade agreements 
follow the state-focused “enforce your own labor laws” model, es-
tablished under the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion (“NAALC”) that was part of NAFTA.  Standard labor provision 
language provides that a party “shall not fail to effectively enforce 
its labor laws . . . through a sustained or recurring course of action 
or inaction, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the 
Parties . . . .”141  But the parties also retain the right to exercise rea-
sonable discretion regarding regulatory and resource-allocation 
matters, including options for enforcement among the fundamental 
labor rights articulated earlier.142  This approach is at one level un-
derstandable given considerations of sovereignty and the unequal 
                                                      
140 See Claire La Hovary, The ILO and the Interpretation of Fundamental Rights at 
Work: A Closer Look at Establishing a Tribunal Under Article 37(2), in ENSURING 
COHERENCE IN FUNDAMENTAL LABOR RIGHTS CASE LAW: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 49, 58 (Social Justice Expertise Center ed., 2016), 
http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/09/SJEC-Conference-booklet-Final-15-September.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5M7L-A8L3] (“For the Employers’ Group, it seems that it is not 
the process of interpretation by the supervisory bodies as such that is the problem, 
so much as the outcomes of that process.”). 
141 U.S.-Peru Agreement, supra note 114, art. 17.3.1(a); CAFTA, supra note 113, 
art. 16.2.1(a). 
142 U.S.-Peru Agreement, supra note 114, art. 17.3.1(b); CAFTA, supra note 113, 
art. 16.2.1(b). 
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resources available across states for enactment, enforcement, and 
dispute-settlement purposes.  Nonetheless, the internalized state-ac-
tion, state-sanctions model means that labor rights provisions in 
trade agreements do not benefit from serious transnational over-
sight.143  Thus, for instance, the United States may draw attention to 
the prevalence of children working on farms in Peru, in violation of 
national laws and Convention 138.144  However, the United States 
has not ratified Convention 138, and laws in the United States allow 
children to work on family-owned farms, or on small farms regard-
less of the hazards involved.145 
In addition, violations require a showing that the failure to adopt 
or maintain ILO fundamental principles has been done “in a manner 
affecting trade or investment between the parties.”146  This language 
appears to subordinate labor law protections to mercantile law and 
transnational mercantile interests.  Even willful violations of statu-
tory or constitutional provisions that protect freedom of association 
or prohibit child labor do not warrant intervention under the trade 
agreement unless it is proven that the violation is directly impacting 
free trade. 
                                                      
143 See Kolben, supra note 105, at 221–22 (discussing criticisms of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements due to “weakness of the enforce-your-own-labor-law 
standard”); Siroën, supra note 123, at 88–90 (contrasting U.S. bilateral agreements 
that focus on enforcement of one’s own labor legislation, and Canadian bilateral 
agreements that give precedence to compliance with domestic legislation over rat-
ification of ILO conventions, with 1999 bilateral textile agreement between United 
States and Cambodia, which expired in 2005, where ILO was assigned to  carry out 
workplace inspections).  
144 See ILAB, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD 
LABOR: PERU, at 1 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/im-
ages/ilab/child-labor/Peru2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ASV-5A9M] [hereinafter 
ILAB 2014 FINDINGS] (reporting 68% of child laborers under the legal working age 
of fourteen work in rural areas, principally on farms).  
145 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(1)(A)(iii) (exempting children 
of any age working on their family-owned farm); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN. [OSHA], U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, POLICY CLARIFICATION ON OSHA’S 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY ON SMALL FARMS (2014), 
https://www.osha.gov/dep/enforcement/policy_clarification_small_farms.html 
[https://perma.cc/BG85-9DKX] (exempting small farms with ten or fewer non-
family employees from enforcement activities).  To be sure, United States or inter-
national trade unions could comment to CEACR with respect to hazardous work 
covered under ILO Convention 182, which the United States has ratified.  But any 
follow up would be between the United States and the ILO, not within a bilateral 
or regional trade agreement.  
146 U.S.-Colom. Agreement, supra note 114, art. 17.2 n.2; U.S.-Pan. Agreement, 
supra note 114, art.16.2 n.2; U.S.-Peru Agreement, supra note 114, art.17.2 n.1; TPP 
Agreement, supra note 131, art. 19.3 n.4. 
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Finally, trade agreement labor provisions typically provide for a 
three-stage process of enforcement:  complaints addressed through 
consultations between governments; followed by an intermediate stage 
of non-binding recommendations that may involve an independent ex-
perts’ panel; and ultimately a final stage of arbitration and possible 
sanctions.147  Disputes involving labor provisions almost never get 
past the initial stage of consultation between governments.148  Per-
haps as a result of the lengthy and inconclusive resolution process, 
complaints filed under the NAALC declined significantly after 
1998,149 and there have been relatively few complaints filed under 
the other trade agreements.150  Complaints that have been filed pri-
marily involve freedom of association—including violence against 
trade unionists, state interference in internal union affairs, and the 
failure to enforce domestic labor laws involving freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining.151  There have also been complaints 
alleging violations of child labor laws.152 
A recurring problem with the dispute resolution mechanisms in 
these agreements is that while trade unions and their supporters can 
file complaints and denounce failures to act on alleged interference 
with fundamental labor rights, what happens to the complaint—
how hard to push a case forward or whether to push at all—is com-
pletely under government control.153  Governments generally would 
prefer to negotiate diplomatic solutions with their trading partners 
behind closed doors, rather than allow a more public airing of pos-
sibly serious violations of domestic laws that are intended to em-
                                                      
147 See, e.g., North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 27–41, 1, 
September 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (stating the mechanism for dispute resolution); 
CAFTA, supra note 113, art.16.6 (stating the mechanism for cooperative labor con-
sultations between parties); U.S.-Chile Agreement, supra note 113, art.18.6 (stating 
the mechanism for cooperative consultations between parties); U.S.-Colom. Agree-
ment, supra note 114, art.17.7; U.S.-Peru Agreement, supra note 114, art.17.7 (provid-
ing the mechanism for cooperative labor consultation between parties). 
148 ILO, Social Dimensions of the FTAs, supra note 106, at 42–47, 50–51. 
149 Id. at 44. 
150 Id. at 50–51. 
151 See id. at 51–52 (discussing complaints filed against Guatemala (2008); Costa 
Rica (2010); Peru (2010); and Honduras (2012)). 
152 See id. at 51–52 (discussing complaints against Dominican Republic (2011) 
and Honduras (2012)). 
153 See Lance Compa, La ‘clausola sociale’ commercio-lavoro a 20 anni dal NAFTA: 
il punto, 66 RIVISTA GIUDIRICA DEL LAVORO 763 (2015) (It.) (unpublished English ver-
sion on file with Author). 
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brace international norms.  In more than twenty years of trade agree-
ment labor provisions in the Americas, only a single case has 
reached the final dispute resolution stage.  Nine years after a com-
plaint was filed against the Guatemalan government, an arbitral de-
cision was recently issued—finding a violation of domestic labor 
laws but no persuasive proof of trade impact.154 
Sanctions are not a panacea for protecting fundamental labor 
rights enshrined in international norms.  A trade agreement penalty 
clause for violation of child labor laws would similarly require es-
tablishing a causal link between violation of the national law and 
economic injury experienced by an industry in the receiving coun-
try.155  Moreover, once establishing the link, any penalty substantial 
enough to have a deterrent effect, such as either withdrawing trade 
benefits or a severe fine, could well cause more immediate harm to 
workers in the affected country (e.g., through lost jobs) than to the 
offending government or the perpetrating employers.156  One could 
argue that trade sanctions should not target the country as a whole 
                                                      
154 A complaint filed in 2008 under CAFTA by six Guatemalan unions and the 
AFL-CIO alleged serious and repeated failures by the Guatemalan government to 
enforce its labor laws, primarily related to freedom of association.  The United 
States called for an arbitral panel in 2011, which was put on hold following an 
agreement in 2013 on an “action plan,” but the United States again requested a 
panel in 2015.  In June 2017, the panel ruled against the United States.  Andrew 
Wallender, United States Labor Dispute Failure Prompts Calls for NAFTA Changes, 
BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY LABOR REPORT (June 29, 2016, 6:01PM), https://conver-
genceapi.bna.com/ui/content/arti-
cleStandalone/247183204000000001/388272?itemGuid =dc067db2-20c6-49d2-
bb5e-7e2852289bca [https://perma.cc/JZ5C-K6WM].  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, IN THE MATTER OF GUATEMALA – 
ISSUES RELATING TO OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 16.2.1(A) OF THE CAFTA-DR, ¶ 594 
(2017), http://trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20%E2%80%93%20Obli-
gations%20Under%20Article%2016-2-1(a)%20of%20the%20CAFTA-
DR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MNQ-FH6A] (“The 
United States has proven that at eight worksites and with respect to [seventy-four] 
workers Guatemala failed to effectively enforce its labor laws by failing to secure 
compliance with court orders, but not that these instances constitute a course of 
inaction that was in a manner affecting trade.  The United States has not proven 
sufficient failures to adequately conduct labor inspections to constitute a course of 
action or inaction.”). 
155 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
156 See Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An An-
alytical Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13, 20–21 (2003). 
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or an entire industry, but only the offending company or compa-
nies.157  And in some national settings, a combination of positive in-
centives and more accurate information about working conditions 
might yield better results than the threat of negative consequences 
for noncompliance.158 
But whether incentives for compliance are positive or negative, 
if complaining parties (e.g., labor unions and employers) could con-
tinue to participate in and influence the process, one result might be 
a more sustained interest in the capacity of trade agreements to pro-
mote adherence to international labor norms.  Importantly, the suc-
cesses of the ILO supervisory system are illustrative in this regard.  
Although they lack authority to impose monetary or other sanctions, 
ILO supervisory mechanisms feature a more transparent, ongoing, 
and participatory process.  This process—devoted to reporting and 
monitoring and supplemented by the provision of technical assis-
tance—engages social partners as well as governments in the effort 
to achieve compliance with labor norms. 
Further, the primary focus of the implementation process is 
compliance with ratified international law, rather than a govern-
ment’s capacity or willingness to follow its already existing domes-
tic laws.  In this setting, conforming changes in national labor law 
can flow from the public dialogue involving a country that feels 
obliged to respond to compliance concerns raised by the CEACR or 
CFA, or to address in person other governments—along with 
worker and employer members—before the CAS when those super-
visory actors are searchingly critical of the country’s violations of a 
ratified convention.159 
 
4.  ILO NORMS AND DOMESTIC LABOR PRACTICES 
 
As discussed in Section 3, ILO norms have had a meaningful im-
pact on the development of domestic labor laws in the Americas 
                                                      
157 See Siroën, supra note 123, at 98.  
158 See Polaski, supra note 156, at 21–22.  
159 For discussion on some of the twenty-five worst cases, see generally ILC, 
Committee on the Application of Standards at the Conference: Extracts from the Record of 
Proceedings, at 56– 62, ILC104 (2015) (El Salvador); id. at 62–68 (Guatemala); id. at 71–
78 (Mexico); id. at 84–94 (Venezuela); id. at 124–28 (Bolivia).  
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since the early 1990s.  Legislatures and courts have adjusted or ex-
panded workplace rights relating to child labor and freedom of as-
sociation, relying on a diverse set of interactions with those ILO 
norms:  (1) ratification of Conventions; (2) response to the supervi-
sory mechanisms; (3) support gleaned from training and technical 
assistance; and (4) commitments undertaken through trade agree-
ments. Progress has been uneven as between countries, and the rel-
ative contribution from trade agreement commitments may be more 
debatable, but the cumulative changes have been quite substantial 
over three decades. 
It remains true, of course, that evolutionary changes in labor 
laws do not always translate to the same degree into progress on the 
ground.  One labor scholar has recently observed that a decade after 
pro-worker reforms in many Latin American countries, labor unions 
continue to lose members, and their strength is shrinking.160  Some 
of this dissonance between law and practice is due to extrinsic fac-
tors such as those mentioned in the United States context—global 
competition, the pace of technology, and political opposition to un-
ions.161 
But an important factor limiting the impact of labor law reform 
is the lack of adequate enforcement.  Labor laws in the Americas are 
increasingly influenced by international norms.  However, such 
laws cannot function effectively as part of a rule-of-law regime with-
out an adequate means to detect violations, a system of meaningful 
punishments, and a commitment to apply both the detection and 
sanctions aspects with some degree of rigor.  Section 4.1. addresses 
certain challenges relating to the implementation process for laws 
sourced increasingly from international norms, and Section 4.2. 
briefly discusses some serious instances of failure to comply with 
child labor and freedom of association laws that are on the books. 
 
4.1.  Dueling Frameworks and Resources for Enforcement 
 
Scholars have observed important differences between labor in-
spection approaches undertaken in the United States versus in most 
                                                      
160 See Anner, supra note 9, at 150.   
161 See supra note 4.  
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Latin American countries.162  In the U.S. legal system, inspection is 
specialized in that different regulations are administered by differ-
ent agencies or divisions within an agency.163  Moreover, the com-
mand-and-control enforcement approach is geared to sanctions for 
noncompliance, especially civil damages or fines, and sometimes 
criminal penalties as well.164  By contrast, labor inspection systems 
in Latin America, which are derived from Franco–Iberian roots, are 
more unified.  The entire labor code is, in principle, administered by 
a single agency, and the inspector’s remit covers every aspect of the 
establishment being examined.165  The Latin American approach is 
also more conciliatory in that the inspector’s role is to initiate and 
oversee a process that can bring about reasonable compliance with 
the law —through advice and consultations perhaps more than fines 
and penalties.166 
                                                      
162 See Schrank & Piore, supra note 9, at 10 (contrasting specialized agency in-
spections and use of penal sanctions in U.S. system of labor market regulation with 
a more unified and conciliatory approach to inspection in Latin America); see also 
Andrew Schrank, Rewarding Regulation in Latin America, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 487, 489 
(2013) (“[H]ighlighting the prospects for rewarding regulation—i.e., regulation that 
redounds to the benefit of the regulated as well as society as a whole—in a number 
of Latin American countries and issue areas.”).  
163 For instance, the Department of Labor is charged with enforcing numerous 
statutes that have distinct enforcement schemes administered separately within the 
Department, including: Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2008); Fam-
ily and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006); Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (1979); Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1970); and Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–
966 (1977).  The Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) and the Mine Safety 
Health Act (“MSHA”) have separate cadres of inspectors, trained under those stat-
utes.  In addition to the Department of Labor, other agencies are authorized to en-
force their own workplace statutes.  Thus, the NLRB enforces the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935), which is addressed to labor management 
relations, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforces several 
antidiscrimination laws: Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1981–2000h-6 (1964); 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1967); and Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990).   
164 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing civil penalties for back pay and liqui-
dated damages for minimum wage and overtime work violations); § 216(e) (provid-
ing civil fines for child labor violations); § 216(a) (providing criminal fines or im-
prisonment for specified willful violations of § 215).  29 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(d) 
(providing civil penalties up to $70,000 per violation); § 666(e)–(g) (providing crim-
inal penalties for violations).  42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(1)–(2) (providing compensatory 
and punitive damages for intentional discrimination violating Title VII or ADA). 
165 See Schrank & Piore, supra note 9, at 10. 
166 See Coslovsky, supra note 12, at 172–173 (discussing alternative labor in-
spection methods used by Brazilian inspectors to ensure compliance); Michael J. 
Piore & Andrew M. Schrank, Transnational Integration and Labor Market Regulation 
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Some observers contend that the Latin American approach is ap-
propriate for its time and place:  Generalist inspectors are in a posi-
tion to establish realistic priorities, negotiate deals with those prior-
ities in mind, and produce acceptable levels of compliance while 
operating within constrained budgets.167  The underlying rationale 
is that lack of compliance with labor laws is in large part a function 
of inability to comply or ignorance of how to manage competitively 
with better labor standards, and addressing these deficiencies of re-
sources and knowledge requires a more collaborative approach to 
enforcement.168 
On the other hand, it may well be that many employers do not 
comply because they are unwilling to do so:  Their competitive ad-
vantage stems in important respects from exploiting the realities of 
low labor standards.  Under such circumstances, a vigorously 
watchful labor inspection system becomes more of a priority.  And 
unfortunately, there is ample evidence of instances where labor in-
spectorates in Latin America lack sufficient training and expertise, 
experience large–scale inefficiencies, or are prone to corruption.169 
                                                      
in Mexico and Beyond, in LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY 
INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 80, 94, 99 (Laszlo Bruszt & Gerald A. McDermott 
eds., 2014) (“Labor inspectors in the Latin world can not only tailor their enforce-
ment efforts to the distinct need of particular firms and workers but can take the 
viability of the enterprise and the value of the jobs it generates into account when 
making their enforcement decisions—all the while looking for ways to reconcile 
compliance with competitiveness.”). 
167 See Schrank & Piore, supra note 9, at 10–11; Coslovsky, supra note 12, at 173, 
189–90. 
168 See Schrank & Piore, supra note 9, at 14–15 (“While Anglo-American inspec-
tors treat non-compliance as a product of individual cost-benefit calculations, and 
therefore try to deter future transgressions by making examples out of current of-
fenders, their Franco-Iberian counterparts treat non-compliance as a product of ig-
norance and inefficiency—and realize that sanctions alone may aggravate, rather 
than solve, the problem.”). 
169 See Schrank & Piore supra note 9, at 21 (describing existing literature’s con-
clusions that “enforcement remains problematic” and non-enforcement is “egre-
gious, systematic, and, in some cases, largely attributable to a lack of political will”); 
CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 371, 376–77 (discussing non-compliance with 
ILO Convention 81, Labor Inspection by Bolivia and Costa Rica); ILC, Rep. of the 
CEACR, Application of International Labour Standards 2015 (I), at 326–28, 333–35, 354–
56, ILC 104/III(1A) (2015) [hereinafter CEACR, 2015 Rep.], 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2015-104-1A).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F6XL-TUKE] (discussing non-compliance with ILO Convention 
81, Labor Inspection by Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru); CEACR, 2014 Rep., supra 
note 83, at 360–62, 388–89, 416–19 (discussing non-compliance with ILO Conven-
tion 81, Labor Inspection by  Colombia, Paraguay, and Venezuela).  In addition to 
CEACR Observations for countries that have ratified ILO Convention 81, but failed 
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Disagreement over the optimal framing approach to labor in-
spection is paralleled by difficulties in interpreting the available ev-
idence on changes in enforcement resources.  When examining 
available data that compares labor inspection activities across Latin 
American countries, there is a broad correlation between increased 
inspector resources in recent years and the existence of a trade agree-
ment with the United States.   
 
Figure 1 
 
Most Latin American countries ranking above average in the ra-
tio of inspectors to workers have signed trade agreements with the 
United States.  El Salvador, Panama, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Do-
minican Republic are five of the six top ranked nations among eight-
een Latin American countries surveyed in 2010–11.170  Four of these 
                                                      
to comply with the provisions, ILO Convention 81 has not been ratified by Canada, 
Mexico, Chile, Nicaragua, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and the United States.  Labour 
Inspection Convention, supra note 33.  
170 See Piore & Schrank, supra note 166, at 90 (illustrating graphically labor law 
enforcement resources in Latin America).  El Salvador, Costa Rica, and the Domin-
ican Republic are members of CAFTA, while Chile and Panama have bilateral 
agreements.  See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.  The sixth country is 
Uruguay, which does not have a trade agreement with the United States. 
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five, along with trade agreement signatories Peru and Colombia, ex-
perienced an enormous increase in their enforcement resources be-
tween the late 1980s and 2009.171  These improvements reflect, in 
part, the impact of cooperative activities with the U.S. Labor Depart-
ment to build capacity pursuant to the trade agreements.172 
At the same time, this interesting data can be somewhat mislead-
ing.  Several countries that rank high in terms of inspectors-per-
worker—El Salvador, Chile, and Guatemala—are also known for 
failures to comply with ratified ILO conventions and their own do-
mestic laws.173  Brazil, which ranks comparatively lower in terms of 
inspectors-per-worker, has a substantially better track record for im-
plementation.174  Additionally, two countries ranking with or below 
Brazil in terms of inspectors-per-worker—Peru and Colombia—also 
have trade agreements with the United States.  Further, the data on 
inspectors-per-worker do not adequately capture the depth or rigor 
with which inspections take place.  For instance, among five Central 
American countries with roughly an equal number of inspectors-
per-worker, the number of annual inspection actions per inspector 
                                                      
171 See Murillo et al., supra note 11, at 806 tbl.31.3 (displaying increase in en-
forcement resources as the following: Chile 185%, El Salvador 175%, Dominican 
Republic 100%, Panama 80%, Colombia 100%, and Peru 135%).  The authors meas-
ured changes in the ratio of labor inspectors to the economically active population.  
Id.  
172 See ILO, ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS, supra note 106, at 3, 41, 65-66, 
74 (describing examples of United States using trade agreement provisions to help 
build capacity in Cambodia, Jordan, Colombia, and Honduras).   
173 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing Chile’s failure to 
comply with ILO conventions and national laws on child labor).  CEACR, 2015 Rep., 
supra note 169, at 72–73, 225–26 (discussing El Salvador’s failure to comply with 
ILO Conventions and national laws on freedom of association and worst forms of 
child labor).  CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 70–72, 188–89 (discussing Guate-
mala’s failure to comply with ILO Conventions and national laws on freedom of 
association and forced labor). 
174 See, e.g., CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 227–28 (welcoming government 
information from national household surveys indicating 59% decrease in child la-
bor from 1992 to 2012); ILO, Business and Child Labour, supra note 36, at 33–59 (dis-
cussing wide range of business initiatives to end child labor in Brazil); CAS, Dy-
namic and Impact, supra note 86, at 75–81 (discussing Brazil’s substantial changes in 
law and practice from 1995 to 2010 to comply with ILO Convention 111 on nondis-
crimination).   
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ranges from 427 to 55, a difference of almost 8 to 1. 
 
Figure 2 
 
From a broader perspective, it is possible that the increased ex-
posure to international trade in Latin America since the 1980s has 
subtly encouraged governments to walk back the rigorousness of 
their labor standards.175  This hypothesis of weakened implementa-
tion may reflect that governments faced with global or regional com-
petition for export share yield to pressure to engage in some form of 
                                                      
175 See Lucas Ronconi, Globalization, Domestic Institutions, and Enforcement of La-
bor Law: Evidence from Latin America, 51 INDUS. REL. 89, 96 (2012) (advancing this 
hypothesis after reporting a substantial increase in exports to, and imports from, 
outside the region from 1985 to 2008). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/2
  
2017] Internationalization of Sources of Labor Law 57 
a race to the bottom regarding labor standards.  For reasons of po-
litical visibility to the electorate, governments contemplating such a 
walking-back may be more likely to weaken labor standards by low-
ering enforcement (“turning a blind eye to noncompliance”) than by 
ratcheting down existing labor legislation.176 
Even presuming some validity to this hypothesis, regional 
trends in enforcement during the period since 1990 are difficult to 
decipher; the results seem decidedly mixed by country.  One study 
reported that enforcement resources increased in nine Latin Ameri-
can countries and decreased in eight others between 1985 and 
2009.177 Another study showed similarly divergent results, reporting 
an increase in enforcement resources between the 1990s and 2000s 
for six countries and a reduction for seven others.178 One way to 
reach beyond the uncertain empirical record on inspection resources 
is to consider country-specific instances of noncompliance with rat-
ified Conventions or enacted domestic laws. 
 
4.2.  Examples of Gaps between Law and Practice 
 
This section does not purport to be comprehensive; rather, it ex-
amines several instances of noncompliance for illustrative purposes.  
In this regard, it may be somewhat easier to measure progress on 
child labor legislation and practice (or an absence thereof), given 
that national data on children in the workforce are collected with 
some regularity and precision.  By contrast, measuring progress on 
freedom of association laws and practices tends to involve analyses 
that are less quantitative, and perhaps somewhat more subjective.179 
                                                      
176 Id.  Ronconi adds that empirical studies do not find that more openness to 
international trade results in a greater likelihood of labor law deregulation, but that 
comparable empirical data is lacking regarding the impact of increased trade on 
labor law enforcement.  See id.  
177 See Murillo et al., supra note 11, at 806 (indicating that the largest propor-
tional increases disclosed by the compiled data are in Chile, El Salvador, and Peru; 
the largest proportional decreases are in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico).  
178 See Ronconi, supra note 175, at 95 (reporting an increase in enforcement re-
sources for Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru; and a 
reduction for Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, and Para-
guay).  These results are generally consistent with those from Murillo et al.—per-
haps not surprising given that Ronconi, a co-author on the Murillo study, uses a 
dataset that updates the earlier version.  See id. at 91.  
179 See Stephanie Barrientos, Gary Gereffi, & Arianna Rossi, Economic and Social 
Upgrading in Global Production Networks: A New Paradigm for a Changing World, 150 
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In El Salvador, reports indicate that the Ministry of Labor has 
not been effective in enforcing the child labor laws that are in 
place.180  The government’s focus is almost exclusively on the formal 
economy although child labor is a far bigger issue in agriculture (es-
pecially coffee and sugarcane) and throughout the informal econ-
omy.  Assessed penalties are insufficient to act as a deterrent, and 
the number of child workers in the country in 2014 appears at least 
as large as the number identified in 2001.181 
The gap between law and practice with respect to freedom of 
association is also substantial.  Both United States and leading NGOs 
report a range of unlawful employer practices including dismissals 
for participating in legal strikes or for other attempts to unionize, 
blacklisting of workers who are former union members, and declar-
ing strikes illegal when they appear to follow domestic law.182  The 
                                                      
INT’L LAB. REV. 319, 324–25 (2011) (illustrating that social upgrading includes meas-
urable standards such as wage levels and working hours and less easily quantified 
standards such as freedom of association and right to collectively bargain); Kevin 
Kolben, Dialogic Labor Regulation in the Global Supply Chain, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 425, 
438 (2015) (differentiating between technical standards, such as wages and health 
and safety, and “process rights” such as freedom of association). 
180 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 27–28 
(2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253225.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C2EC-JLD4]; Matthew E Johnson, CAFTA and International Hu-
man Rights in El Salvador: Is the United States Acquiescing to Widespread Workers’ Hu-
man Rights Violations?, 4 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 162, 170 (2005). 
181 Compare Johnson, supra note 180, at 170 (reporting 2001 State Department 
data that 75,000 children between ages 5 and 13 were working; 147,000 working 
between ages 14 and 17), with U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS 
OF CHILD LABOR: EL SALVADOR 1 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/ilab/reports/child-labor/find-
ings/2014TDA/elsalvador.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDA9-N5NJ] (reporting that 
approximately 165,000 children ages 7 to 14 were either working or combining 
work and school).  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, 
supra note 180, at 27–28 (reporting that child labor “remained a serious and wide-
spread problem” with “limited effectiveness” of enforcement efforts). 
182 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 180, at 26–
27 (reporting that the government is ineffective in enforcing right to association and 
collective bargaining rights, and that the government lacks resources to conduct 
inspections); Johnson, supra note 180, at 169 (describing reports of the government 
violating the right to association by dismissing, blacklisting, and threatening work-
ers); CENTER FOR GLOBAL WORKERS’ RIGHTS & WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM , UNHOLY 
ALLIANCES: HOW EMPLOYERS IN EL SALVADOR’S GARMENT INDUSTRY COLLUDE WITH A 
CORRUPT LABOR FEDERATION, COMPANY UNIONS AND VIOLENT GANGS TO SUPPRESS 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS 8 (2015) [hereinafter UNHOLY ALLIANCES], 
http://lser.la.psu.edu/gwr/documents/UnholyAlliances_January2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ST37-TKP7] (concluding that the Salvadoran government is not 
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Salvadoran government is reported to contribute to such practices, 
through legal recognition of employer-controlled unions, support 
for corrupt labor organizations, and weak enforcement of existing 
labor laws which in any event include less than adequate penalties 
for employers who retaliate, as well as labor inspectors who are 
prone to corruption and bribery.183 
Guatemala is another country with a solid record of ILO ratifi-
cations and relatively strong protections in its labor code, but a siz-
able gap between law and practice.  The country has a history of 
employers and governmental authorities engaging in violence 
against trade unions and workers, including death threats, abduc-
tion, torture and murders.184  Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has the low-
est rate of unionization among seventeen Latin American coun-
tries.185  Even for workers who are unionized, government policies 
                                                      
effective in enforcing labor law, and that it encourages corrupt labor organizations 
and employer-controlled unions).  
183 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 180, at 26 
(arguing that the $114 maximum penalty for employers who interfere with the right 
to strike was not sufficient to deter violations); Johnson, supra note 180, at 169 (quot-
ing from State Department’s 2001 Report stating that government inspectors were 
prone to bribery); UNHOLY ALLIANCES, supra note 182 at 8–10 (describing history of 
ILO raising serious noncompliance concerns with the government through the 
years). 
184 See, e.g., van Roozendaal, supra note 88, at 18, 20 (describing reports of the 
Guatemalan government engaging in violent oppression of trade unionists and 
workers such as killings, threats, and torture); ILC, Rep. of the CEACR, Application 
of Int’l Labour Standards 2011 (I), at 83–87, ILC 100/III/1A (2016) [hereinafter 
CEACR, 2011 Rep.], http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2011-
100-1A).pdf [https://perma.cc/2WMV-GX7T] (describing repeated efforts by 
CEACR, CAS, and Committee on Freedom of Association to have the Government 
address acts of violence that continually go unpunished); ILC, Rep. of the CEACR, 
General Report and Observations Concerning Particular Countries, at 110–12, 
ILC.102/III(1A) (2013) [hereinafter CEACR, 2013 Rep.], http://www.ilo.org/pub-
lic/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2013-102-1A).pdf [https://perma.cc/7P9V-T6MY] 
(detailing the reported murders of trade unionists from 2007 to 2012); CEACR, 2015 
Rep., supra note 169, at 88 (“The Committee notes with deep concern that, according 
to the information provided . . . [sixteen] trade unionists were murdered between 2 
January 2013 and 20 August 2014.”).  
185 See Mark Anner, Meeting the Challenges of Industrial Restructuring: Labor Re-
form and Enforcement in Latin America, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 33, 37 (2008) (re-
porting unionization rate below 2%, compared to rates over 20% in Argentina, Bra-
zil, Mexico, Nicaragua; between 11% and 20% in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Venezuela; and between 5% and 10% in Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Peru). 
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establish registration and support requirements that seriously im-
pede collective bargaining and the right to strike.186 Further, child 
labor is widespread for ages seven to fourteen, mainly in rural areas, 
and legal protections are difficult to enforce because some three-
fourths of the workforce is employed in the informal economy.187 
In Mexico, extensive legal protections for freedom of association 
are in place, reflective of international and domestic legal princi-
ples,188 but they are far from fully realized in practice.  The pervasive 
control exercised by “official” unions, through contracts of protec-
tion and other “sweetheart” arrangements, has undermined the ex-
ercise of rights to organize and bargain for independent, democratic 
workers’ organizations.189 
                                                      
186 See FREEDOM HOUSE, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2012: GUATEMALA 8 
(2012), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Guatemala%20-
%20FINAL_0.pdf (“Anti-union policies include a 25 percent union registration re-
quirement for collective bargaining within a company; a stipulation that strikes 
need to be supported by 51 percent of the workforce, as well as a broad definition 
of the ‘essential services’ sectors within which strikes are barred.”); CEACR, 2015 
Rep., supra note 169 (asking the Guatemalan government to amend requirements 
such as requiring strikes to be called by a majority of the workers instead of a ma-
jority of those casting ballots). 
187 See COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 186, at 8–9 (reporting on seri-
ous shortcomings in administering the rule of law); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 
FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: GUATEMALA 1, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/reports/child-la-
bor/findings/2014TDA/guatemala.pdf (reporting that one-third of children age 7 
to 14 were either working (e.g., 19.2%) or combining work and school (e.g., 14.6%)); 
UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN’S WORK IN GUATEMALA 2–4 (ILO, UNICEF, & World 
Bank eds., 2003) (describing prevalence and characteristics of children’s work). 
188 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [C.P.] as 
amended, DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACIÓN [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917, Title VI, 
art.123 (Mex.); Maria Teresa Guerra & Anna L. Torriente, The NAALC and the Labor 
Laws of Mexico and the United States, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 514–16 (1997) 
(noting the rights Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution establishes such as a max-
imum working day of eight hours, paid day of rest, vacation and equal pay for 
equal work).  
189 See Guerra & Torriente, supra note 188, at 524–25 (contending that the right 
to collectively bargain has been adversely affected by corrupt union bosses in con-
cert with management); OFF. OF TRADE & LAB. AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUBLIC 
REPORT OF REVIEW OF U.S. SUBMISSION 2015-04 (MEXICO) PURSUANT TO NAALC  3–7 
(2016), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/070816-Chedraui-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J9VR-J453] (detailing how protection contracts undermine 
workers’ rights); Graciela Bensusan, Organizing Workers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Mexico: The Authoritarian-Corporatist Legacy and Old Institutional Designs in a New 
Context, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 131, 144, 154–55, 158 (2015) (arguing that union rep-
resentation has an inverse meaning in that unions defend the interest of the em-
ployers and the government instead of the workers).  
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Finally, in Peru, despite laws prohibiting child labor, nearly 20 
percent of children age six to fourteen are working and not in 
school.190  This very high proportion of noncompliance—three times 
higher than in Argentina or Colombia and five times higher than in 
Brazil191—may reflect the challenges of child labor enforcement in 
rural areas and across the informal economy.  Yet it seems that other 
Latin American countries faced with comparable challenges are 
achieving substantially better results.192 
These examples of sizable gaps between law and practice should 
not be taken to mean that such gaps are uniformly present or even 
broadly prevalent.  In Brazil, the combined efforts of the national 
government, the ILO, NGOs, and local businesses have reduced the 
number of children at work by more than 50 percent since the early 
1990s—a removal of nearly five million children from the labor 
force.193  Key elements of the country’s implementation effort were 
                                                      
190 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: 
PERU 1 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/re-
ports/child-labor/findings/2014TDA/peru.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q2M-
8UMV] (showing that 19.4%, over 1 million children, are working and not in 
school). 
191 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: 
ARGENTINA 1 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/2014TDA/argentina.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UR5F-GY7M] (showing that 6.5% of children are work); U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: COLOMBIA 1 (2014), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/reports/child-la-
bor/findings/2014TDA/colombia.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX3C-3FU2] (showing 
that 5.9% of children work); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS OF 
CHILD LABOR: BRAZIL 1 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/2014TDA/brazil.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9NE8-LWLF] (showing that 3.5% of children work). 
192 Based on Department of Labor data, Guatemala, with 19.2% of children 
working, not in school, is close to Peru’s results. For discussion of the extent of in-
formality in labor markets across Latin America, see ILO, NONSTANDARD 
EMPLOYMENT AROUND THE WORLD: UNDERSTANDING CHALLENGES, SHAPING 
PROSPECTS 60-62, 104 (2016).  The South American country closest to Peru in terms 
of exhibiting a high level of temporary employment contracts as well as informal 
economy jobs is Ecuador.  See id.  Yet in 2014, only 2.7% of children age 5 to 14 
(75,689) in Ecuador were working and not in school—a proportion less than one-
sixth that in Peru.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 FINDINGS ON WORST FORMS OF CHILD 
LABOR: ECUADOR 1 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/2014TDA/ecuador.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69F7-C6UK]. 
193 See CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 227–28 (“The Committee welcomes 
the Government’s information that the results of the national household surveys 
from 1992 to 2012 indicated a drastic reduction in child labour from 8.4 million chil-
dren (between the  ages of 5–17 years) in 1992 to 3.51 million  children in  2012, 
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the establishment of a specific inspection scheme within the Child 
Labor Eradication Program, and the registration of hundreds of 
thousands of families with child labor participants for social and 
monitoring services.194  In Mexico, efforts undertaken since 2000 
have resulted in a 40% decrease in the number of twelve- to four-
teen-year-olds working.195  In addition to the commitment of public 
and private actors in the labor law arena, the success stories in these 
two countries result from more active policies in the area of educa-
tion as well as a transformation of the economy away from the agri-
cultural sector.196 
Further, child labor experience in Canada illustrates that even 
within a single country, variations in local government practices can 
be substantial—some essentially consistent with international 
norms while others depart from those norms.197  And the experience 
                                                      
indicating a reduction of  4.9 million [59%] during this period.”); del Vecchio, supra 
note 38, at 27 (detailing Brazil’s concerted effort to eradicate child labor since the 
1990s through school stipends, labor inspections, special task forces, and the Na-
tional Forum for the Prevention of Child Labor). 
194 See CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 228 (“[T]he fight against child labour 
in Brazil, through regular inspections and specific programmes for the eradication 
of child labour, comprises both the formal and informal  sectors, including family 
enterprises.”); ILO, Evaluation Summary, supra note 95, at 2 (“The project has con-
tributed with methodologies for the process of identification and registration of 
working boys, girls and adolescents and their families, as well as with the creation 
of monitoring instruments . . . .”). 
195 UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN’S WORK (UCW) PROGRAMME, THE MEXICAN 
EXPERIENCE IN REDUCING CHILD LABOUR: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY LESSONS 
22–23 (2012), http://www.ucw-project.org/attachment/Report_Child_La-
bour_trends20130308_111116.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BQC-4VX5]. 
196 See id. at 32–33, 45 (discussing factors in Mexico); ILO, Business and Child 
Labour, supra note 36, at 34 (emphasizing importance of Brazil’s increased access to 
educational opportunities including free mandatory education for all children be-
tween ages four and seventeen). 
197 See BC CHILD AND YOUTH ADVOCACY COALITION, CHILD LABOUR IS NO 
ACCIDENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF BC’S WORKING CHILDREN 26–28 (2013), 
http://firstcallbc.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Child-Labour-
Is-No-Accident-FirstCall-2013-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YEZ-DJS7] (reporting on 
child labor practices in British Columbia and Alberta that follow lowering of the 
work-start age to twelve—with parental permission—in those two provinces; the 
work-start age is fourteen or sixteen in Ontario and Saskatchewan, and several 
other provinces allow children to work under age fourteen only with detailed re-
strictions beyond parental permission); Lynette Schultz & Alison Taylor, Children 
at Work in Alberta, 32 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 431, 432–433 (2006) (criticizing lowering the 
working age in Alberta as contravening principles of international labour agree-
ments).  Canada recently ratified ILO Convention 138 in June 2016, and there may 
be pressure for a more nationally imposed set of requirements and practices going 
forward.  
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of implementing Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples reflects variation among ratifying countries regarding per-
ceived implementation costs—in one very recent instance, costs as-
sociated with prior consultations on energy and infrastructure in-
vestment projects.198 
Overall, the magnitude of gaps between law and practice can be 
seen at least in part as a function of country-specific factors involv-
ing distinctive economic organization, political dynamics, and back-
ground cultural elements.199  Accordingly, a satisfactory account of 
national variations may need to dwell on the saliency of these eco-
nomic, political, and cultural factors, as well as on larger evolution-
ary developments across continents or regions. 
 
5.  INTERNATIONALIZED LABOR LAW SOURCES IN A                         
BROADER SETTING 
 
Having identified and analyzed an evolution toward reliance on 
international sources for domestic labor law and, to a lesser extent, 
labor practices in the Americas, I close by suggesting ways in which 
this evolution may be understood as consistent with larger patterns 
in the development of international labor and human rights law. 
 
5.1. Sourcing of International Law by National Governments 
 
Halton Cheadle has concisely noted certain significant obstacles 
to the direct importation of international labor law into domestic 
law.200  International labor law tends to be general and flexible in its 
obligations and focuses on government conduct, whereas domestic 
                                                      
198 See ILO Bureau for Employer’s Activities Launches a Report on Convention 169 
and its Implementation in Four Latin American Countries, (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://www.ilo.org/americas/sala-de-prensa/WCMS_507952/lang—
en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9G78-PQJ8] (analyzing implementation of Con-
vention 169 in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala based on studies con-
ducted in 2013 and 2014); COURTIS, supra note 59. 
199 These factors are manifested in a lack of resources devoted to enforcement, 
a lack of will—attributable to politics and/or corruption—or some combination of 
the two.  
200 See Halton Cheadle, Reception of International Labour Standards in Common-
Law Legal Systems, 2012 ACTA JURIDICA 348, 351. 
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laws and regulations are usually more detailed and reticulated and 
they centrally regulate the conduct of private actors.201  In addition, 
approval of labor conventions at the national level may be perceived 
as a threat to values of federalism, based on the division of authority 
between national and provincial or local governments in many 
countries.202  Finally, the possible adoption of international labor 
norms through domestic court decisions before those norms have 
been legislatively approved, or perhaps even debated, raises con-
cerns about the outsized role of a national judiciary, especially in 
common law countries.203 
However, as Cheadle also observes, these genuine obstacles 
hardly operate as absolute barriers to application of international 
norms in suitable domestic circumstances.204  Harold Koh has writ-
ten about the complex processes by which countries come to adopt 
and comply with international law, including human rights law.205  
In addition to well-recognized motivations stemming from national 
self-interest and national identity,206 Koh emphasizes the im-
portance of three distinct procedural elements:  “interaction within 
the transnational legal process, interpretation of international norms, 
and domestic internalization of those norms as determinants of why 
nations obey.”207  Each of these elements is importantly present in 
the international labor law context I have examined. 
There is multidimensional interaction with a transnational legal 
process.  Countries are regularly engaged with ILO governance and 
supervisory mechanisms—through review and ratification of con-
ventions, through exchanges with the CEACR, CAS, and CFA, and 
                                                      
201 Id. at 351. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 351–62 (discussing various channels through which international law 
has been adopted in domestic settings—legislation, self-executing provisions, cus-
tomary international law, and judicial interpretation).  
205 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale 
L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, International Law]; Harold Hongju Koh, How is In-
ternational Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 Ind. L.J. 1396 (1999) [hereinafter Koh, 
Human Rights Law].  
206 See generally Koh, Human Rights Law, supra note 205, at 1407 (discussing obe-
dience related to economic incentives such as trade benefits, and conformity related 
to a desirable political identity in the global community of nations). 
207 Koh, International Law, supra note 205, at 2634; see also Koh, Human Rights 
Law, supra note 205, at 1399–1400 (identifying the same three-phase process and 
noting its evolutionary quality). 
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through partnering efforts involving ILO staff and advisors.  This 
interaction is deepened through countries’ participation in the pro-
liferating number of bilateral and regional trade agreements, almost 
all of which invoke ILO principles if not ILO standards as attainable 
goals. 
The interpretation of international norms has been conveyed on a 
provisional basis,208 initially and continuously through the ILO su-
pervisory bodies—the CEACR, CAS, and CFA—as well as through 
ILO leadership and staff.  Interpretations also have been conveyed 
on occasion through transnational tribunals, including the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.209  And the internalization of 
those norms has been accomplished through the efforts of national 
law-making entities.  This has taken place across all three branches 
of government: statutes embody or assimilate the norms; executive 
decrees or regulations provide for their implementation; and judi-
cial decisions apply and extend them in the context of national facts 
and circumstances. 
Koh’s approach is not the only explanatory theory that seeks to 
account for the internalization of international human rights law.  
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks contend that international law may 
change state behavior through a process they refer to as “accultura-
tion,”210 and which they distinguish from two recognized social 
                                                      
208 Under Article 37 of the ILO Constitution, authoritative interpretations of 
Conventions occur through referral to the International Court of Justice or appoint-
ment of a special tribunal.  In the absence of such referral or appointment, the 
CEACR, as part of its “impartial and technical analysis of how the Conventions are 
applied in law and practice by member States . . . must determine the legal scope, 
content and meaning of the provisions of the Conventions, [through] opinions and 
recommendations [that] are non-binding, being intended to guide the actions of 
national authorities.”  CEACR, 2016 Rep., supra note 77, at 9. 
209 See, e.g., Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, Eur. Ct.H.R 1345 (2008) (invoking 
ILO Convention 87), http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1345.html 
[https://perma.cc/N7U8-5AJF]; Case C-438/05, Int’l Transport Workers’ Federa-
tion and Finish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R I-10779, C-341/05, 
Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others, 2007, 
E.C.R I-11767 (invoking and limiting scope of ILO Convention 87); Yakye Axa In-
digenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R, No. 127, 130, 136 (June 17, 2005) (construing ILO Convention 169). 
210 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
Int’l Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004) (“By acculturation, we mean the 
general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the 
surrounding culture.  This mechanism induces behavioral changes through pres-
sures to assimilate-some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self.”).   
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mechanisms for influencing states’ behavior—persuasion and coer-
cion.211  According to Goodman and Jinks, a state may adopt the be-
havioral norms and policies of a surrounding culture, influenced by 
social expectations and the perceived conduct of important refer-
ence groups.  These conformity-induced adjustments in norms are 
not tantamount to full acceptance of the persuasiveness or legiti-
macy of a given norm, nor are they based on a calculation of material 
costs and benefits.212 
One might understand the considerable internalization of inter-
national labor law in the Americas to be a function of acculturation 
as distinct from persuasion or coercion.  The ripple effect resulting 
from Convention ratifications across the region is likely to have con-
tributed to a socialized acceptance of ILO norms on child labor and 
freedom of association.213  At the same time, increasing conformity 
with ILO norms in law, with a meaningful lag in practice, reflects 
that states may be less than fully persuaded of the norms’ intrinsic 
merits or legitimacy.  And conformity to those norms is not a func-
tion of material cost-benefit assessment.  Despite the presence of la-
bor provisions in trade agreements, the costs of noncompliance with 
ILO norms are likely to be shaming and shunning rather than loss 
of favorable trade or investment status. 
Stepping back, international labor and human rights law is not 
typically enforced through interstate action.  In contrast to agree-
ments focused on commercial trade or arms limitations that have an 
important element of self-enforcement between states, the direct 
beneficiaries in ILO conventions are not the governments but third 
parties.214  For this reason among others, the internalization of inter-
national labor law at the domestic level seems incompletely realized 
when compared to certain other forms of international law.  Unlike 
nations’ willingness to endorse and comply with international trea-
ties governing security and self-defense, or commercial transactions, 
                                                      
211 See id. at 633–38 (describing coercion and persuasion). 
212 See id. at 638–55 (describing how acculturation differs from both persuasion 
and coercion as mechanisms of social influence over States). 
213 See Kahn-Nisser, supra note 31. 
214 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
119–27 (2005).  As stated supra in notes 22–23 and accompanying text, in a bilateral 
commercial trade or arms limitation agreement, violation of a provision by one state 
effectively invites a violation by the other.  The same dynamic does not apply when 
one state violates child labor norms or unlawfully restricts trade union activities. 
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transnational labor standards have not often been embraced in the 
same comprehensive or nuanced ways by national governments. 
Still, the liberalization of trade and investment—while hardly 
free from controversy—is perceived by almost all governments to 
be in their national self-interest.  This liberalization has been accom-
panied in the Americas and elsewhere by a substantially expanded 
role for ILO norms and ILO supervision, as governments have come 
to understand that public support for trade and investment requires 
a fairer distribution of its benefits across entire populations.  In rec-
ognizing the essential nature of this social dimension, the World 
Trade Organization, the World Bank, and other transnational bodies 
dedicated to economic growth have accepted the ILO regime as the 
primary means to promote decent working conditions and mini-
mize exploitation or abuse of workers.  Consequently, more coun-
tries view efforts to impose labor protections of their own, through 
adoption of and compliance with international labor standards, as 
one of the keys to admission into full-partner nation status.  Again, 
trade agreements play a role in these developments:  They attract 
the appetite and interest of governments and they often lead to in-
creased consciousness about the links between domestic labor laws 
and international labor standards. 
And yet, there remains a meaningful distance between ac-
ceptance in law and compliance in practice.  The gaps are evident 
with respect to implementation of both ratified ILO conventions and 
negotiated labor provisions in trade agreements.  That declared 
commitments to monitoring and enforcement have been incom-
pletely realized indicates that internalization of these norms remains 
a work in progress. 
 
5.2.  Sourcing of International Law by Transnational Corporations 
 
The internalization of international labor law norms reflects con-
tributions from transnational private actors as well as governments, 
although such contributions are not the focus of this article.  In ad-
dition to convention ratifications and trade agreements, there are 
norms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) promulgated in 
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scores of voluntary codes and ostensibly promoted and imple-
mented by transnational corporations.215  These codes can be an im-
portant reputational asset with consumers and investors, including 
institutional consumers such as universities and local governments, 
and institutional investors like public pension funds and socially 
conscious mutual funds.216 
CSR codes often embrace the eight fundamental ILO conven-
tions, and they have become more explicit about doing so in recent 
years.217  At their strongest, these corporate codes may declare that 
management “adhere[s] to the eight fundamental conventions of the 
ILO,” including identifying by name and number Conventions ad-
dressed to freedom of association and child labor, and may further 
state that “where our own principles and regulations are stricter 
than local legislation, the higher standard applies.”218  At the same 
time, transnational corporations often have separate codes for their 
suppliers, which tend to accord greater protection to supplier em-
ployees than their own workers.219 
                                                      
215 See Rhys Jenkins, The Political Economy of Codes of Conduct, in CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13, 
13–22 (2002); Robert H. Montgomery & Gregory F. Maggio, Fostering Labor Rights 
in Developing Countries: An Investors’ Approach to Managing Labor Issues, 87 BUS. 
ETHICS 199 (2008).  
216 See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 35–45, 61–66 (2005). 
217 See Brudney, supra note 138, at 559–67 (reporting on codes of conduct for 
twenty-seven multinational corporations, including their invocation of ILO Con-
ventions and Principles and their propensity to adopt distinct approaches for sup-
pliers as contrasted with their own employees).  
218 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Nestec, Ltd., Human Rights and 
Labour Practices, in NESTLE CORPORATE BUSINESS PRINCIPLES 3, 9 (2010), 
http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/corpo-
rate_governance/corporate-business-principles-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR5D-
S6PE]. 
219 See Brudney, supra note 138, at 563–64 (describing greater protection for 
freedom of association offered by six transnational corporations to supplier em-
ployees than to their own workers).  Nestle is an outlier in this respect:  It holds 
suppliers to a less rigorous standard than it demands of itself.  Compare supra note 
218 and accompanying text with NESTEC, LTD., THE NESTLE SUPPLIER CODE 2 (2013), 
https://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/suppli-
ers/supplier-code-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/43N2-UTB6] (“[Supplier] should 
grant its employees the right to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.”). 
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There has been ample criticism of these codes as ineffective or 
little more than window-dressing.220  But it is worth noting the par-
allels between development of the corporate codes, often featuring 
ILO norms, and the evolution of domestic law sources discussed in 
Sections 3 and 4 above.  Since these codes were launched in the 
1990s, their language has become stronger and their scope wider, 
and they have achieved some modest practical successes.221 
Part of this strengthening involves attention to ways in which 
transnational brands can utilize corporate codes to bring pressure 
on their global supply chains—acting either on their own or pursu-
ant to the recently promulgated United Nations Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights.222  Further, the codes can be important com-
plements to efforts at the national regulatory level.  Private auditors 
operating in particular sectors of the economy, such as export-pro-
cessing zones, may mollify (if not liberate) government regulators 
who must allocate their limited resources among delinquent actors 
throughout the country.223  Private and public regulators also can 
work together—including with ILO involvement—assisting gov-
ernments that lack the willpower to impose or otherwise effectuate 
compliance on their own.224 
                                                      
220 See, e.g., Axel Marx & Jan Wouters, Redesigning Enforcement in Private Regu-
lations: The Case of International Labour Governance 1, 5–8 (Leuven Ctr. for Glob. Gov-
ernance Studies, Working Paper No. 126, 2013), https://ghum.ku-
leuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp121-130/wp127-
marx-wouters.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6AM-WEU6] (discussing problems with 
internal audits and putatively independent monitoring of code compliance); JILL 
ESBENSHADE, MONITORING SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE GLOBAL 
APPAREL INDUSTRY 110–11 (Temple Univ. Press, 2004) (discussing expense involved 
in corrective action and subsequent audits to monitor ongoing compliance); Fred-
erick Mayer & John Pickles, Re-embedding the Market: Global Apparel Value Chains, 
Governance, and Decent Work, in TOWARDS BETTER WORK 17, 28–29 (Arianna Rossi et 
al., eds., 2014) (summarizing multiple limitations to this private governance ap-
proach). 
221 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 93–97 (2010); Lance Compa, Corporate Social Respon-
sibility and Workers’ Rights, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1–2 (2008). 
222 See JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2013); Anne Trebilcock, Due Diligence on Labour Issues: Opportunities and 
Limits of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 93, 93–107 (2015). 
223 See Coslovsky, supra note 12, at 172.  See also Locke, supra note 103, at 164, 
170 (discussing successful efforts in several countries at private enforcement of 
norms contained in national labor regulations and ILO standards). 
224 See, e.g., Mayer & Pickles, supra note 220, at 34–35 (describing Better Work 
Cambodia program, in which Cambodian export apparel industry operates since 
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One might well conclude that the codes are largely ineffective 
when standing alone, because not adequately monitored or rigor-
ously enforced.  This gap between promulgation and compliance 
echoes in certain respects the distinction between law and practice 
that is evident when governments have subscribed to international 
public law norms.  At the same time, the endorsement of interna-
tional labor standards protections by transnational brands raises 
possibilities for monitoring corporate compliance with those stand-
ards through certain types of contractual relationships.  These pos-
sible relationships notably include agreements between brands and 
workers that cross national boundaries.225  In short, the private law 
codes suggest possibilities for a more horizontal form of internation-
alized sourcing of labor standards, one that supplements the more 
vertical country-by-country developments analyzed in Sections 3 
and 4. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
There has been a substantial infusion of ILO norms as sources 
for change in domestic labor law over the past twenty-five years.  I 
have focused on the Americas in this article, but there is ample rea-
son to believe that the trend exists in other parts of the world as 
well.226  Change has taken place through the more direct route of 
                                                      
2006 under combination of private self-regulation and national and international 
public interventions, notably ILO, combining independent monitoring with pro-
grams of training and technical assistance); Michael Posner & Justine Nolan, Can 
Codes of Conduct Play a Role in Promoting Workers’ Rights?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR 
STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 207, 222–23 (Robert J. Flana-
gan & William B. Gould eds., 2003) (describing ILO role in monitoring the 1999 
U.S.-Cambodia Textile Quota Agreement, specifically implementation of program 
to improve working conditions in apparel industry in compliance with interna-
tional labor standards as well as domestic law); Locke, supra note 107, at 166–68 
(describing complementary private and public regulation to improve conditions of 
electronics contract workers in Czech Republic). 
225 See James J. Brudney, Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply Chains: The 
Immokalee Workers Model, in TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL ERA: THE 
REGULATORY CHANGES 351, 351–76, (Joanna Howe & Rosemary Owens eds., 2016); 
Felix Hadwiger, Global Framework Agreements: Achieving Decent Work in Global Sup-
ply Chains?, 7 INT’L J. LAB. RES. 75 (2015).  
226 See Kahn-Nisser, supra note 31, at 525 (reporting that between 1998 and 
2002, thirty-nine of the forty-five European countries studied had ratified seven or 
eight of the eight fundamental ILO conventions, compared with seventeen coun-
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ILO convention ratification followed by legislative adjustment, and 
through the less direct route of trade agreement labor provisions.  
The convention ratification route is classic soft law but with a con-
tinuous and participatory implementation and “shaming” focus.  
The trade agreement route implicates reciprocal compliance pres-
sures, although these provisions have not yet proven to be enforce-
able in traditionally meaningful ways. 
I have argued that the internationalization of labor law sources 
is aptly characterized as evolution rather than transformation, and 
it has been more successful at the level of laws than practices.  Pro-
gress has been incremental and there have been setbacks as well as 
advances.  Sources for both labor law and labor practice will con-
tinue to change in evolutionary ways.  At least in the near-term, we 
can expect the process to continue to be steadier and less erratic at 
the level of law than of practice. 
 
                                                      
tries in 1998).  Similarly, the eight Asian countries heavily involved in garment pro-
duction have fifty ratifications—out of a possible sixty-four—for these eight funda-
mental conventions; thirty-two of the fifty occurred since the early 1990s.  For a list 
of ratifications by Convention and date ratified for each country, see Ratifications of 
ILO Conventions By Country, ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11001:::NO:::. 
[https://perma.cc/7PXB-CGQX] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).  For discussion of the 
eight Asian countries and the number of ratifications by each, see Brudney, supra 
note 225, at 354–55.  See also Beaudonnet, supra note 53 (discussing substantial num-
bers of domestic court decisions in Europe, Africa, and Asia as well as the Americas 
that have invoked ILO norms as of 2010). 
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